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The objective of this study was to determine if contract
incentives were appropriate for use in Department of Defense
contracts for the purpose of motivating defense contractors
to improve the maintainability of weapon systems under
design. To accomplish the objective it was necessary to
review the components of maintainability to determine appro-
priate targets for the incentives and to study the concepts
and issues involved in the use of incentives to motivate
contractor performance. The conclusions were based in part
on the responses obtained during interviews conducted with
Government representatives and engineering, contracting, and
corporate and program management personnel from the defense
industry. In addition, the incentive program in the case of
the F/A-18 aircraft was reviewed and analyzed to det-ermine
the reason for its success. The study concluded that incen-
tives were appropriate for use in maintainability improve-
ment and that in structuring the incentive program the award
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I. INT20DDCTI0N
A. GENERAL
Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) is a concept intro-
duced over two decades ago. In June 1964 the Department of
Defense issued its directive which defined ILS as "a
composite of the elements necessary to assure the effective
and economical support of a system or equipment at all
levels of maintenance for it's programmed life cycle."
[Ref. 1: p. 2] The general policies of that directive
succinctly stated the importance of ILS in the following:
Development of ILS for a new system shall be initiated
concurrently with the performance requirements or at the
earliest possible time in the conceptual phase and at
the procurement planning phase for commercially avail-
able items. The evolution of logistic support, that is,
the integration of . its elements shall be the result of
progressive system analyses of the plan for use and the
plan for support and indicated trade-offs between these
plans through all phases of the project. [Ref. 2: p. 2]
Integrated Logistics Support is composed of eleven
elements: maintainability, reliability, maintenance plan-
ning, supply support, support and test equipment, transpor-
tation and handling, technical data, personnel and training,
and interim support [Ref. 3: p. 10]. It differs from normal
logistics concepts in that it involves several different
disciplines and that it involves the interaction of all the
elements throughout the entire programmed life cycle of the
system. The logistics costs cf a weapon system comprise
about eighty percent of its life cycle cost. However, in
the past ILS did not receive the same consideration early in
the acquisition process as did the hardware to be used in
the system. The importance of ILS cannot be overemphasized
in the wake of increasingly complex weapon systems and the
staggering expenditures of tax dollars required to purchase
and support them. Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown
emphasized that point in Consolidated Guidance when he said
of our tactical air forces:
The costs of buying and operating tactical air forces
are taking an increasing share or the defense budget.
Their increasing complexity is a significant factor not
only in this growth, but also in an increasing diffi-
culty in maintaining the combat readiness of our air
crews and their equipment. These trends if continued,
could jeopardize our ability to maintain a force that is
large enough, that is modern enough, and that is ready
enough to carry out our plans. [Ref. 4: p. 29]
To further emphasize the need for more ILS considera-
tions in weapon system acquisition and to outline a program
for improving the acquisition process Mr. Frank C. Carlucci,
the Deputy Secretary of Defense, issued a memorandum in
April 1981 that contained thirty-two initiatives designed to
accomplish necessary improvements [Ref- 5]. Mr. Carlucci
felt that if these tasks were successfully accomplished,
system acquisition would be streamlined and cost savings
would result. One of the initiatives specifically required
that readiness objectives be established for each weapon's
development program and then required that reliability and
maintainability be designed into the system. This initia-
tive has been restructured to include key aspects of other
of the initiatives, one of which is the use of incentives to
motivate the contractor to improve the readiness and support
of newly acquired systems [Ref. 6: p. 15]-
Incentives are not new to defense contractors but to
date have focused primarily on motivating performance,
schedule, and cost objectives of the contracting parties
[Ref. 7: p. 30]. However, various forms of incentives have
recently been used in the area of logistics in an effort to
improve the availability of today's systems. To date these
incentives have largely been in the form of warranties and
have focused on the negative motivational aspects of an
incentive [Ref. 7: p. 31]. They have been structured to
become effective after the equipment has been fielded rather
than in the design phases of the acquisition. A more effec-
tive incentive might be to motivate the contractor during
the design of the equipment so that improved availability is
designed into the system frcm the start rather than
attempting to remedy it after the system is developed. This
thesis explores the use of incentives toward that end.
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The objectives of the research were: (1) to investigate
the concepts, characteristics, and issues involved in the
topical areas of incentives and maintainability, (2) to
determine if defense contractors could be motivated to
improve the maintainability of a system during design, and
(3) how that motivaticn might be accomplished.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIOHS
The primary research question was: Can Can incentives
be used in Government contracts to improve the maintain-
ability of equipment acquired in the future?
The subsidiary research questions were:
1. What is maintainability?
2. How does maintainability relate to the acquisition of
equipment today?
3. What motivates a contractor to do business with the
Government today?
4. What are the significant characteristics of contract
incentives?
5. What would the objectives of incentives for maintain-
ability be in Department of Defense contracts?
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6. What are the current methods used to promote main-
tainability in Government contracts?
7. How can incentives be used to motivate the contractor
to improve maintainability?
D. SCOPE
The main thrust of the study focuses on the element of
Integrated Logistics Support known as maintainability and
the appropriateness of using incentives with the contractor
designing the system in an attempt to improve it. The
research focuses primarily on the Government's use of incen-
tives with defense contractors in the procurement of major
end items. In addition, research was conducted into the
area of incentives with particular attention paid to the
most effective incentives from the contractor's point of
view. Finally, the study shows how incentives can be used
to motivate contractors to improve maintainability during
the design phases of the acquisition. The study does not
attempt an analysis or the construction of a maintainability
model. It does not attempt to evaluate the cost-
effectiveness of maintainability nor does it critique
current maintainability engineering techniques. The study
does suggest possible methods cf motivating contractors to
improve maintainability in systems under design.
E. METHODOLOGY
In order to answer the primary and subsidiary research
questions a combination of research techniques was utilized.
The first of these was to use existing data in the litera-
ture on maintainability models, maintainability, ase of
incentives, structure of incentives, and contractor motiva-
tion to form the basis of the study. The second research
technique involved interviews with Government logistics
1 1
personnel and defense contractor representatives from compa-
nies located primarily in the California area. These
contractor personnel included individuals in contracts,
engineering, program managers, and other acquisition
personnel as would be appropriate for this study. A list of
the personnel interviewed appears in Appendix A of this
thesis. To permit those interviewed to answer questions
freely, all interviews were conducted on the basis of nonat-
tribution. A list of the primary interview questions
appears in Appendix 3 of this thesis.
F. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
The major assumption in the study is that the reader has
some familiarity with the procurement process but not neces-
sarily a professional background in the field. It is
further assumed that the reader is aware of the relationship
that exists between the defense industry and the Department
of Defense.
The major limitations encountered in the study involves
the material currently available on the use of incentives in
the manner under study. A great deal of material exists
that discusses incentives, but Eost of that material concen-
trates on the use of incentives to motivate the contractor
to stay on schedule or under cost. Only recently have
attempts been made to motivate the design contractor to
improve any of the elements of support and published
material on the effectiveness of those efforts is not yet
available.
G. OBGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
The study is organized in the following manner: Chapter
II contains a description of the acquisition process, the
design process and pertinent definitions. Chapter III is a
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discussion of the issues concerning maintainability and
their role in the acquisition process. Chapter IV contains
a discussion of the issues surrounding the use of incentives
in defense contracts and a discussion of those factors that
motivate defense contractors to do business with the
Government. Chapter V discusses the case of the F/A-18
program and the incentive program used to improve the main-
tainability of that system and provides an analysis of the
program's success. Chapter VI provides an analysis of the
problems and issues surrounding the use of incentives for
maintainability improvement. Chapter VII finishes the study
by providing conclusions derived from the research, recom-
mendations on potential future use of incentives to improve
the maintainability of new weapon systems, and answers to
the research questions.
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II. BACKGROUND AND FRAMEWORK
A. MAJOR SYSTEHS ACQUISITION PROCESS
In this chapter the major system acquisition process and
the system design process will be discussed and pertinent
definitions to be used later in the thesis will be provided.
The introduction of a major weacon system is the result of a
detailed and systematic decision process. The process
begins with the recognition by the Secretary of Defense or
one of the DoD component chiefs that a need exists in some
mission area [ Ref . 8: p. 3]. The mission need can be the
result of a perceived or actual change in the current
threat, a change in the state of technology, or a change in
an assigned mission element. Continuing analyses of
assigned missions by the Secretary of Defense, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the DoD components establishes the need
for the new system. The purpose of the analyses is to iden-
tify deficiencies or to identify more effective means of
performing assigned missions [Ref. 8: p. 3]. However,
before making the decision to acquire a new system, a thor-
ough investigation of alternatives is conducted to ensure
that the need cannot be satisfied by a change in tactical or
strategic doctrine, the use of existing military or commer-
cial systems, or through the modification and improvement of
an existing system [Ref. 8: p. 4]. After the identification
of a need is established and acquiring a new weapon system
is determined to be the only satisfactory means of satis-
fying the need, there are two basic requirements to be
satisfied for initiation of the acquisition process: the
first, is the preparation of a Mission Need Determination
(MND) and the second, is the allocation of funds for the
system [Ref. 9: p. 10].
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The allocation of funds for a new system is guite
involved in itself as it is integrated fully into the
Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PP3S) used to
develop this nation's budget. Stated briefly, however, to
receive funding for a program a Justification for a Major
Systems New Start (JMSNS) is submitted with the DOD compo-
nent's Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) to the Secretary
of Defense. The Secretary of Defense then issues a Program
Decision Memorandum (PDM) which includes the approval or
disapproval of the JMSNS. Approval of the JMSNS authorizes
the start of the new system and begins the acquisition
process.
There are four major phases in the acquisition process
today: Concept Exploration, Demonstration and Validation,
Full Scale Development, and Production and Deployment. The
phases follow the same general pattern regardless of the
acquisition category of the system being acquired. There
are four major Acquisition Categories (ACAT) for a new
system differentiated primarily by the authority level at
which the decision to continue cr not to continue the acqui-
sition is made [Ref. 9: pp. 32-34]. The categories are also
differentiated by dollar thresholds for research and devel-
opment costs and production costs for the system. In ACAT I
level systems the decision authority rests with the
Secretary of Defense for most of the acquisition process. A
financial threshold of $200 million for research and devel-
opment and $1 billion for production is usually considered
to be the minimum threshold for an ACAT I system. Most
major weapon systems remain in this category. ACAT II
programs utilize the service Secretary as the decision
authority and utilize a threshold of $100 million for
research and development costs and $500 million for produc-
tion costs. ACAT III and ACAT IV retain decision authority
within the DoD component concerned and do not utilize
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thresholds for research and development or production costs.
These categories are differentiated primarily by the effect
of the acquired system on existing hardware or mission capa-
bilities. [Ref. 9: p. 34] It should be noted that the
Secretary of Defense can retain decision authority regard-
less of the thresholds involved if the urgency of need and
development risk are high or it is a joint program with
other nations or between more than one DoD component
[Ref. 9: p. 4]. For the purposes of this study the acquisi-
tion process described will be that of an ACAT I level
system.
The first major phase of the acquisition process is the
Concept Exploration Phase. During Concept Exploration many
activities take place; among them the appointment of a
program manager, the drafting of his charter, the develop-
ment and refinement of an acquisition strategy, the initia-
tion of studies to arrive at performance, cost, schedule,
and supportability estimates, and the development of test
and evaluation criteria. The most important activity,
however, in this phase is the solicitation from industry,
in-house laboratories, and universities for alternative
concepts for evaluation as a means of satisfying the mission
need. The objective of the Concept Exploration Phase is to
select the most promising system concepts to continue into
the second phase of the process. Maintainability considera-
tions are in its infancy during Concept Exploration. They
are usually stated as a series of general parameters that
form the basic maintainability objectives for the system.
[Ref. 3: p. 22] Concept Exploration ends with a decision at
Milestone I. This decision is made by the Secretary of
Defense based upon information provided in the Milestone
Review Documentation (MRD) which includes a Systems Concept
Paper (SCP) and a Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) .
An approval of the MRD at Milestone I concludes the Concept
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Exploration Phase and starts the Demonstration and
Validation Phase of the acquisition. [fief- 9: p. 14]
During the Demonstration and Validation Phase the
surviving alternatives undergo analyses, hardware fabrica-
tion, and test and evaluation to verify that the risks and
uncertainties involved in the remaining alternatives are
identified and reduced to acceptable levels [ Ref - 9: p. 41].
This phase is used to demonstrate that the needed technology
is at hand to ensure that only engineering development is
required to develop the concept. In addition to verifying
the existence of the technology necessary for the system,
performance and mission envelopes are defined and trade-off
analyses of capabilities versus cost are conducted in order
to select the concept for full scale development. During
Demonstration and Validation, maintainability parameters are
allocated to the lower levels of the system and these param-
eters begin to become more definite and measurable. The
contractors developing the design begin to make their trade-
off analyses to test the achievabili ty of the objectives
stated. [fief- 3: p. 22] The objective of the Demonstration
and Validation phase is to identify the system concept
having the greatest potential for meeting the mission need
in a cost effective manner. The conclusion of Demonstration
and Validation occurs at Milestone II. At Milestone II the
Secretary of Defense reviews the HfiD for the system. The
MRD is basically the same as that used at Milestone I except
that a more detailed Decision Ccordi- nating Paper (DCP) is
used instead of the SCP. In some cases, the decision
authority will require more detail than that present in the
DCP and thus require that an Integrated Program Summary
(IPS) be submitted also. . Approval of the MRD at Milestone
II concludes the Demonstration and Validation Phase of the
process and authorizes entry into Full Scale Development of
the system. [Ref. 9: pp. 41-45]
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The Full Scale Development Ehase is a period of careful,
iterative, and detailed engineering effort [Ref. 9: p. 51].
By this stage in the acquisition process, the alternative
concepts have been narrowed down to one or two systems that
can satisfy the mission need in a cost effective manner.
The objective of this phase is the demonstration and docu-
mentation of a cost effective, operationally suitable, reli-
able and production engineered system that meets the mission
need. [Eef. 9: p. 53] During full scale development the
producibility of the system will be demonstrated through the
establishment of the production lines to be used during the
last phase of the process. Also, during this phase the
maintainability parameters estatlished earlier and allocated
to the system can be tested en the prototypes developed
during this phase. By this stage in the system's develop-
ment the design effort for the maintainability of the system
is virtually completed [Ref. 3: p. 23]. The final decision
point, Milestone III, requires the same basic documentation
as that required in Milestone II, however, in many cases the
decision authority for approval at Milestone III has been
delegated to the DoD component Secretary [Ref. 9: p. 66].
Milestone III concludes the Full Scale Development Phase and
begins the Production and Deployment Phase of the acquisi-
tion process.
Those activities designed to produce the system in a
cost effective manner and issue it to the inventory describe
the Production and Deployment Phase of the acquisition
process. This phase will continue until the system is no
longer required to fulfill a mission requirement. Although
the process consists of four distinct phases, flexibility
and concurrency are encouraged where possible to expedite
the fielding of the system. Fexibility and concurrency,
however, are not to be pursued at the expense of sound
management practices. The entire acquisition process is
evolutionary in nature beginning with a mission need,
evolving into a conceptual idea, then into an engineering
prototype, and finally into a mission ready system for the
user.
B. THE DESIGN PROCESS
The design process is also evolutionary in nature begin-
ning with an idea and evolving into a physical model of the
system. The process begins with a conceptual design which
includes feasibility studies directed toward defining a set
of useful solutions to the need to be satisfied [Ref. 10: p.
186]- The output from this phase of the design contains a
technical baseline for the system, a definition of the
systems operational requirements, and the maintenance
concept [Ref- 10: p. 186]. This phase of the design process
occurs during the Concept Exploration Phase of the acquisi-
tion process. The second phase of the design process is the
Preliminary System Design. During this phase of the design
the baseline configuration identified in the conceptual
design is used to identify system level requirements and
detailed qualitative and quantitative characteristics
[Ref. 10: p. 186]- It is during this phase of the design
that trade-off studies, logistics support analysis, configu-
ration definition, and functional analyses and allocation of
reliability and maintainability factors are conducted.
Preliminary System Design occurs during the Demonstration
and Validation Phase of the acquisition process. The final
stage of the design process is the Detail Design and
Development Phase and includes those activities associated
with the Full Scale Development phase of the acquisition and
concludes with the existence of a physical model or proto-
type of the new system [Ref- 10: p. 188]. As can be plainly
seen, the major design decisions are already made before the
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end of the Full Scale Development Phase of the acquisition
process. If improved maintainability of the system is an
objective of the acquisition and incentives to the
contractor are the means to accomplish it, contractual
implementation of those incentives must be achieved early in
the acquisition process.
C. DEFINITIONS
The definitions contained in this section and the acro-
nyms associated with them will be used throughout the
remainder of this thesis.
1 • Operational Availability (Ao)
Operational availability is the probability that a
system or equipment, when used under stated conditions will
operate satisfactorily when called upon. It is calculated
by dividing the mean time between maintenance actions by the
sum of the value for mean time between maintenance actions
and mean maintenance downtime. [Ref. 10: p. 67]
2. Mean Corrective Maintenance Time (Met)/ Mean Time to
Repair (MTTR)
Each time a system fails a series of steps is
required to repair or restore the system to its full opera-
tional status. These include fault detection, isolation,
disassembly, repair, reassembly, and checkout. Completion
of these steps constitute a corrective maintenance cycle.
The composite value representing the arithmetic average of
the individual maintenance cycle times is known as Hct or
MTTR. [Ref. 10: pp. 36-37]
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3. logistics Delay Time (I IT)
logistics Delay Time refers to that maintenance
downtime that is expended as a result of waiting for a spare
part to become available, waiting for test equipment, trans-
portation, or facilities. It does not include active main-
tenance time but does constitute a major element of total
maintenance downtime. [Ref. 10: p. 46]
4. AdmJ.n_isjtra.tive Delay Time (ADT)
Administrative delay time refers to that portion of
downtime during which maintenance is delayed for reasons of
an administrative nature such as: personnel assignment
priority, labor strikes, personnel training requirements,
and organizational constraints. It does not include active
maintenance time. [fief. 10: p. 46]
5. Maintenance Downtime (MET)
This is the total elapsed time . required to repair
and restore a system to full operational status or retain a
system in that condition. It includes mean active mainte-
nance time, logistics delay time, and administrative delay
time- [Eef. 10: p. 46]
6 . Mean Activ e Maintenance Time (M)
Mean active maintenance time is the average elapsed
time required to perform scheduled and unscheduled mainte-
nance and excludes Logistics Delay Time and Administrative
Delay Time. [fief. 10: p. 45]
7. Mean Time Be tween Maintenance (MTBM)
Mean time between maintenance is the nean time
between all maintenance actions (scheduled and unscheduled)
and is calculated by dividing 1 by the equipment failure
rate and the preventive maintenance rate. [Ref. 10: p. 46]
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8 • life Cycle Cost
Life cycle cost is the total of all costs associated
with a particular weapon system and is calculated by taking
the sum of research and development costs, procurement
costs, and operation and mainteiance costs.
D. SUMMARY
In this chapter the major systems acquisition process
was described and the decision milestones, documentation,
and acquisition categories were identified. In addition,
the design process was discussed and its relationship tc the
phases of the acquisition process was established. Finally,
definitions of terms to be used in subsequent chapters were
provided as well as the acronyis associated with them. In
the next chapter the concept of maintainability will be
discussed as well as the relevant issues concerning its role




This chapter discusses the issues surrounding the
concept of maintainability. The discussion includes a
description of the components of maintainability, the role
of maintainability in the evolution of the design of the
system and its role in the acquisition process, and finally,
it includes an identification cf the potential areas where
trade-offs may occur. Maintainability has a quantitative as
well as a qualitative definition, which complement each
other to define the term. The purpose or qualitative defi-
nition of maintainability is:
To ensure the new weapon system has the characteristics
of material design and installation which make it
possible to meet operational objectives with a minimum
expenditure of maintenance effort under the same opera-
tional conditions in which scheduled and unscheduled
maintenance will be performed. [ Ref . 11: p. 1]
Quantitatively, maintainability is:
A characteristic of design which is expressed as the
probability that an item will be restored to specified
conditions within a given period of time when mainte-
nance action is performed m accordance with prescribed
procedures and resources. [Ref. 11: p. 1]
Put simply, maintainability is that element of ILS that
deals with the design of a weapon system or component
thereof, such that consideration is given to shortening the
period of time the system is iroperable because of preven-
tive or corrective maintenance actions.
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B. CC3P0NENTS OF H AIHTAINABILI1Y
The discussion of the components of maintainability in
this thesis will focus on the eight major elements which
comprise a typical maintenance cycle. The components of
maintainability are: delay tine, preparation time, fault
location time, item ottainment time, fault correction time,
adjustment and calibration time, checkout time, and adminis-
trative time [Eef- 11: p. 11]. These elements are directly
associated with the actions required in a corrective mainte-
nance action. However, since many of these actions are also
required in a preventive maintenance action the two types of
maintenance cycles will not be differentiated in the discus-
sion that follows.
Delay time is the first element to be considered. Delay
time is defined as the time lapse between the occurrence of
the failure and the technicians response to the call for
maintenance. Delay time originates from two different
sources. The first, fault detection, can range in time from
a few seconds in automated systems or systems with extensive
built-in-test equipment to several hours in manually oper-
ated systems. Fault detection time becomes a significant
factor in systems operational readiness testing and normal
operations when operational availability is a primary
requirement. The second component of delay time involves
technician notification and is essentially a communication
task, which accounts for the time period between systems
failure and the technicians response. [ Ref . 11: p. 9]
The second element of maintainability is called prepara-
tion time. Preparation time is simply the tims it takes to
gather the tools and equipment necessary to perform the
maintenance. This time occurs prior to the commencement of
repair work and would include any time required to obtain
additional tools after repairs began. Influences on
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preparation time include location and manner of storage of
tools and test equipment as well as the number and varieties
that will be required. [Eef. 11: p. 9]
The third element of maintainability is fault location
time, which is the time required to localize, gain access,
and identify the failure. Fault location is composed of
three elements. The first, fault localization, is the time
required to determine which major component of the system is
down. This is accomplished through the use of malfunction
symptoms, test equipment, or ether features built into the
system. In manual systems this can be an extremely time
consuming task, often the result of trial and error method-
ology in trying to localize the failure. The second element
of fault location is gaining access to the failure. This is
the time required to open the eguipment and remove any parts
that interfere with troubleshooting and replacement opera-
tions. Types of fasteners used and the size, type, and
location of access openings influence the time required to
gain access to the failure. The final element of fault
location is failure isolation. In manual systems this
element often accounts for more time than any other task in
the cycle and may account for as much time as all others
combined. The trial and error methodology necessary to
isolate the failure cften results in excessive time spent in
this element. However, even in automatic systems failure
isolation can be extremely time consuming task unless the
system is automated down to the individual part level,
creating a system which is often very expensive to produce.
Fault location is probably the biggest area in which
improvement can be made in the early stages of the design of
the system. [Eef. 11: p. 9]
The fourth element of maintainability focuses on the
time required for the technician to obtain parts, assem-
blies, or units needed for the maintenance action. This
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time, item obtainment time, includes the time required to
identify the item, prepare the requisition, obtain the part
from the storage area, and return to the repair area.
Backorder time is not considered here, but is included in
the Logistics Delay Time (IDT) as part of the total
Maintenance Downtime (MDT) . [Bef. 11: p. 9]
The fifth element of maintainability is the time it
takes to perform the maintenance on the failed item either
in place on the equipment or to replace the broken item with
a replacement obtained earlier. The fault correction time
can range from a few minutes to several hours. The mean of
these times taken over a number of maintenance actions is
commonly referred to as the equipment's Met. [ Eef . 11: pp.
9-10 ]
The sixth element is the time necessary for recalibra-
tion, retuning, and adjustments required because of differ-
ences between the original item and its replacement. This
period is known as adjustment and calibration time.
[Ref. 11: p. 10]
The seventh element is called checkout time and is the
time required to reassemble and checkout the equipment.
Reassembly time measures the time necessary to replace the
items removed during disassembly and maintenance. The
second component, checkout, is the time required to deter-
mine if the equipment is operating properly and can be
returned to service. [Ref. 11: p. 10]
The final component of maintainability is administrative
and logistics time and includes downtime due to backordered
parts, lack of space, test equipment, or maintenance facili-
ties, and all the time due to nonavailability of personnel
caused by administrative functions. This component is
commonly referred to as Administrative Delay Time (ADT) .
[Ref. 11: p. 10]
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Over a weapon system's life cycle hundreds of mainte-
nance actions will be required and they follow the general
pattern just described. The average time it takes to
complete this cycle is known as the Mean Time To Repair
(MTTB) for the system. However, notice those components of
maintainability that are really susceptible to being influ-
enced by the design of the system's hardware. The designer
of the system can influence only three of the eight compo-
nents described, because only three are strictly equipment
related. The first of these is delay time and it can be
shortened significantly through the use of Built-in-Test
Equipment (BITE) designed to improve fault detection and
notification. Early fault detection often prevents further
damage and reduces the cost of repairing systems or compo-
nents that fail as a result of the first failure. Fault
location is the second component that can be directly influ-
enced. The time required to localize, gain access, and
isolate the fault can be shortened with the appropriate use
of BITE, the proper placement of access panels,- fasteners,
and components, and the thoroughness of the technical publi-
cations that accompany the equipment. The final component
of maintainability that can be influenced by design is cali-
bration and adjustment time. Here again, BITE, test site
and jacket placement, and test procedures help shorten that
time. The other elements of the ILS plan such as supply
support, maintenance planning, personnel training, personnel
availability, and transportation and facilities determine
the remaining five elements of the maintainability of a new
system. The designer may have an affect on these elements
through his recommendations to the ILS planners but it will
not be the same as the affect he can directly apply to the
hardware design itself.
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C. IHPACT OF MAINTAINABILITY
One of the major objectives in the acquisition of any
new weapon system is to acquire the system that most effec-
tively satisfies the mission need [ Ref . 8: p. 3]- A measure
of the system's effectiveness in which maintainability has a
pronounced effect is the life cycle cost of the system.
This is most noticeable in the support costs that accrue
during its life. Studies have shown that improved maintain-
ability in a system significantly lowers the maintenance
costs by reducing the labor hours and spares required to
maintain it [Ref. 12]. These savings generally accrue
during the operating life of the system and are difficult to
measure in the early phase of the acquisition. As one
contractor representative stated during an interview:
The buyer wanted it yesterday* he wasn't concerned with
the supportability of it, all he wanted was a system
that could perform now. It wasn't until after the
system was fielded did he worrv about supportability and
then it became really expensive to provide the support
package he wanted.
Developing support packages after the deployment of the
system is not an uncommon occurrence. Seven of those
personnel interviewed stated that when the budget became
tight the support for the system generally was the first
area to be cut. One of those interviewed stated that during
a production contract negotiation in which he was
participating:
The Government buyer asked hew much maintainability he
could get for 375,000; the contractor told him and the
buyer deleted the entire item.
The problem these incidents pcint out is that maintain-
ability is not being considered as a design objective of the
new system as a means of reducing the life cycla costs, but
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only as something concrete that can be added or deleted to
the system if there is a spare dollar in the budget.
The previous chapter stated that the design process is
evolutionary in nature and, as in nature, this process
starts from the basic foundations laid during the earliest
phases of the acguisition process. As those interviewed
stated:
This means that during the pre-concept exploration
period that clear. concise objectives regarding main-
tainability for -the new system must be considered.
These objectives should consider the priority maintain-
ability receives in funding as well as tne desired
objectives for such measures as MTBM, MMH/OH, MTTR, and
Ao.
They also said that during concept exploration these objec-
tives need to be communicated to those industries, labora-
tories, and universities developing these concepts. The
objectives should not be communicated in terms of hardware
or configuration because this would constrain the designer.
As one interviewee related concerning the development of the
MX missile:
By telling us it had to be a three stage missile vice a
two stage one our ability to design the most maintai-
nable one was impaired because that dictated the place-
ment of access panels and complicated the design by
adding additional components to the system.
During the demonstration and validation phase of the acgui-
sition when preliminary design is underway, the achiev-
ability of maintainability objectives can be used as a means
of determining which designs to pursue [Ref- 10: p. 186].
Finally, as the design matures into a piece of hardware
during full scale development the maintainability of the
items produced as prototypes can be tested [Ref. 12].
Maintainability is not something that can be added to a
system; it must be designed into it and therefore, must be
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considered from the initiation of the program [Ref. 12].
Maintainability is not an entity unto itself and is usually
designed into a system at the expense of something else;
trade-offs become necessary [fief. 12].
D. TRADE-OFFS CONSIDERED
Many trade-offs exist when discussing maintainability
and reliability; most of these are parametric trade-offs
such as weight vs. performance, maintainability vs. weight,
reliability vs. life cycle cost, and many others that can be
developed. Two of these trade-offs, maintainability vs.
reliability and life cycle cost vs. maintainability, are
emphasized to demonstrate : (1) the relationship that
exists, (2) that changing one parameter affects another
parameter of the system, and (3) that trade-offs cannot be
accomplished in a vaccuum. The first is the trade-off that
exists between the maintainability and the reliability of a
system. The nature of the relationship is such that as more
maintainability is designed into the system the reliability
of the system decreases due to the increasing complexity of
the equipment and the need for additional systems to ensure
rapid failure detection and location [Ref. 12]. As far as
the contractor representatives interviewed were concerned,
unless directed to do otherwise, their efforts would be to
keep the reliability portion of that relationship high at
the expense of maintainability. They indicated that the
adverse publicity and impact on future business is greater
on a system that is constantly failing than the damage to
business caused by the extended amount of time it requires
to fix a particular system. Further, interviews with
Government and contractor personnel confirmed that the
contractor performed the bulk of the detailed trade-off and
decision analyses because the buying office generally did
not have the "tools or the time" to prepare such analyses.
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The other trade-off considered concerns the relationship
that exists between life cycle cost and maintainability.
Assuming that a balance has been reached between reliability
and maintainability and that maintainability has been
designed into the system; even though the initial acquisi-
tion costs will be higher, the operating costs of the systern
will be less than if maintainability were not considered.
The savings that result will be generated by the reduction
in man-hours spent in the maintenance of the equipment, the
savings generated because unnecessary spares are not
purchased, and the improved operational availability of the
system. This trade-off is hard to demonstrate to a program
manager at the initiation of a program because he is
constrained by a limited budget and funding for the oper-
ating and maintenance costs in which the savings will accrue
are programmed from another source.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter provided a discussion of the concept of
maintainability. Also in this chapter, maintainability was
divided into its eight components. The chapter identified
those components that the hardware design could influence
and described the impact of maintainability on the life
cycle cost of the system and its role in the acquisition
process. Finally, the chapter described the trade-offs
involved between maintainability and reliability and main-
tainability and life cycle cost. The next chapter discusses





This chapter discusses the concepts and issues involved
in the use of incentives in defense contracts. Some of the
issues this chapter discusses include: (1) tha significant
characteristics of an incentive; (2) the factors that moti-
vate the contractor to do business with the Government; (3)
the functions and types of incentives; (4) the role of
uncertainty in incentive contracts; (5) the current struc-
tures of incentives in defense contracts; and (6) when to
use incentives in defense contracts.
The American Heritage Dicticnary defines an incentive as
"something inciting to action or effort, as the fear of
punishment or the expectation of reward; motivation."
[Ref. 13: p. 664] In acguisit ion, the concept surrounding
the use of incentives is that they are generally employed to
motivate the contractor to place extra effort in a partic-
ular area of the contract and are designed to serve as a
reward for that effort. This usually means increasing the
contractor's profit in response to the contractor satisfying
some predetermined objective. There are five basic func-
tions of incentives as applied to the acguisition environ-
ment. The first function is to attempt to distribute some
of the risk of development programs between the contractor
and the Government. The second function of an incentive is
to communicate the Government's objectives in a particular
program ty targeting those areas in which the Government
desires the contractor to concentrate his efforts. The
third function of an incentive is to allow the contractor to
make cost, schedule, and performance trade-offs when
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designing a system. The fourth function of an incentive is
to help alleviate industry claims that a yap exists in the
free enterprise system. The last function of an incentive
is to motivate the contractor. [Ref. 14: p. 30] However,
incentives to date generally have not done well in accom-
plishing contractual objectives, but seem to have shewn
value in directing contractor attention and in assisting
communication among the contracting parties [Ref. 14: p.
30]. One factor that seems tc contribute to the lack of
effectiveness of incentives targeted at cost, for example,
is the low share that the contractor must pay for any cost
overruns [Ref. 15: p. 242]- As Irving Fisher stated in a
study conducted for the RAND Corporation,
Incentive contracts probably are not saving the
Government much money through increased efficiency and
better cost control. Consequently, the merits of incen-
tive contracts will have to be judged on other grounds.
[Ref. 16]
Incentive contracts in the past have generally targeted
cost, schedule, and management performance of the
contractor. The reasoning for the past approaches to incen-
tive contracting may have been an overemphasis on the risks
involved in the development of a new weapon system
[Ref. 14].
B. INCENTIVES AND RISK
In every new weapon system acquisition, risk abounds; it
exists in the technology of the proposed system , the costs
estimates of the system, the proposed schedule for the
system, and the achievable performance levels of the
required system to name a few. Risk defined in the context
of acquisition is "the possibility of an unfavorable devia-
tion from expectations; that is, the occurrence of an
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undesirable contingency." [Ref. 17: p. 3] Most businesses,
when acting as a whole, tend to be risk averse, that is,
they prefer perfectly certain investments to uncertain ones
with an egual but uncertain return [Ref. 18: p. 206]. The
Government, on the other hand, is generally classified as
risk neutral for the following reasons: (1) the wealth of
the Government is high in relation to the value of the indi-
vidual decision to be made; (2) the Government's significant
ability to pool the risks involved; and (3) empirical
evidence showing the Government's willingness until the mid-
1960s to negotiate pure cost-reimbursement type contracts
[Ref. 15: p. 20]. Hence, in an effort to control cost over-
runs, delays in schedule, and pcor performance in new weapon
systems, the Government was willing to accept a greater
share of the risks involved in developing the system by
entering into incentive arrangements that split the savings
that resulted from cost underruns or the excess costs that
resulted from cost overruns [Ref. 15: p. 14].
C. IHCENTIVE STROCTORES
There are two basic structures for incentive arrange-
ments currently in use today. One structure involves the
use of a share ratio that divides the difference between the
actual costs incurred on a contract and the target cost of
the contract according to a predetermined ratio that awards
or assesses a proportion of the savings or overruns to the
contractor and distributes the remaining share to the
Government. This structure is used primarily to motivate
the contractor to stay under the target cost on a particular
contract, the theory being that the contractor will be moti-
vated to control costs if thev share in the savings that
result. However, there is some doubt as to the effective-
ness of this sharing of savings in being motivating to the
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contractor to reduce costs [Kef. 14]. Recent studies have
indicated that the share allotted to the contractor has not
been large enough to motivate the contractor to control
costs or alter his approach to cost control [Ref. 14].
The other incentive structure is the award fee. The
award fee concept is usually targeted toward performance and
delivery reguirements, program milestones, and management
goals in a contract and involves the establishment of
rewards to be given, either in whole or in part, to the
contractor periodically upon demonstrated performance in one
of the targeted areas. These areas are usually reviewed on
a regular basis and awards are made based upon these peri-
odic reviews. Contractor personnel interviewed stated that
they favored the use of the award fee structure because it
reguired the contract to specify the requirement, the test
criteria, the time of the review, the amount of the award,
and generally made the objective of the incentive very clear
and concise. They felt that the use of the award fee
allowed contractor management to make choices about which
incentives to pursue, helped them, place a value on the
incentive, and helped motivate those people that worked on
the incentive because it could be stated as a clear objec-
tive for the program. An award fee could be publicly
displayed as a goal for the work force to attain and could
be used to help explain the extra effort reguired to deliver
a product ahead of schedule. Eight of the twelve contractor
personnel interviewed felt the objectivity that they had
experienced in the incentive structure in award fee
contracts made it a more effective motivating tool than the
share ratio structure.
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D. SIGNIFICANT CHARACTERISTICS OF INCENTIVES
What are the significant characteristics of an incen-
tive? This question was asked of all the personnel inter-
viewed for this study. The answers to the question were as
diverse as those who answered it. However, those inter-
viewed generally agreed that an effective incentive should
contain at least the characteristics described below.
The first and most important characteristic of an incen-
tive should be its positive approach. The incentive should
be a reward for performance rather than a penalty for
failure to perform. The warranty and the Reliability
Improvement Warranty are good examples of a negative incen-
tive or penalty approach. The contractor is motivated to
build a system that does not fail because of the implica-
tions of the warranties in the contract. They said the
warranty represents a duplication of effort because if the
contractor produces systems that io not perform they will
not remain in business for very long. Those interviewed
generally agreed that negative incentives do not motivate
them to produce any more than the minimum specified require-
ments of the contract. Further, they said, these warranties
were not just given away; that the Government paid a great
deal of money for them and cften encountered difficulty
enforcing them. They felt that this negative approach
created unnecessary animosity between the Government and the
contractor. They also pointed out that the contractor has
as much at stake as the Governnent in a major weapon system
acquisition and that if the system fails it only hurts busi-
ness in the long run. They indicated that the development
of a major weapon system is a team effort and that a posi-
tive approach to solving the development issues was more
conducive to the kind of performance desired of the system.
They recognized the need for warranties and did not object
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to them in contracts they had, however, they resented the
usa of the warranty as a tool to induce performance. They
felt a positive approach using a reward for performance
above the minimum target specified would be more effective
in stimulating the contractor and would probably not cost
any more than the negative alternative.
Another characteristic the interviewees listed for an
incentive was recognition. They felt that an incentive
should recognize superior performance as well as superior
performers. The interviewees pointed out that the
Government and public were quick to recognize the failures
of a contractor and very slow to recognize the accomplish-
ments. They also stated that Government recognition of the
superior performance of the engineers, assemblers, and other
manufacturing people was lacking. They acknowledged tnat
the recognition they described was really a corporate func-
tion, but the contractors said it would really be a morale
booster if the Government acknowledged, if even only by
letter, that the employees of XYZ corporation surpassed the
quality requirements of a contract and delivered a product
that won an incentive award specified in the contract. They
indicated that those responsible for the achievement of the
incentive went unrecognized and sometimes were not aware
that an incentive was won.
The interviewees mentioned another characteristic of an
incentive, that is, it must challenge the contractor. Some
felt that the incentives offered for superior performance in
contracts they currently had were not challenging. In fact,
one interviewee stated regarding some of the incentives on
the F/A- 18 program that many cf the reliability standards
established as goals for incentive awards were too easy. A
contractor stated that his company considered many of the
performance criteria established by the Government well
within their capabiities and worked as though the criteria
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were just the minimum specifications to be met on the
contract. Their company was not challenged to go beyond
their capabilities. "The higher the intended level of
achievement the higher the level of performance." [Ref. 20:
p. 163] People tend to concentrate their efforts towards
those areas that yield the highest rates of reinforcement
[Ref. 20: p. 167]. Challenge is a form of reinforcement.
The contractors felt that the incentives established should
te sufficiently challenging in crder to put some uncertainty
into the achievability of the incentive. It should be chal-
lenging but not unrealistic. The interviewees also acknowl-
edged that it is quite easy to look back and say an
incentive was too easily met and quite another to attempt to
develop an incentive during Concept Exploration that is
realistic and challenging when the concept to solve the
mission requirement has not yet been established.
Another significant characteristic mentioned by those
interviewed was timeliness. The timeliness they refer to
has to do with awarding the contractor the rewards stated in
the contract when the reward is earned. They stated that
many times the award of the incentive reward was given well
after the engineers or other manufacturers who achieved it
had left the company or began wcrk on another project. They
felt that too often the incentive was paid as a share of
savings and was hidden in payments to the contractor long
after the incentive goal was attained. They preferred to
see the incentive paid when it was demonstrated that the
performance goal had been met.
The last and most significant characteristic of an
incentive according to the interviewees was that it should
motivate the contractor to perform. They felt the incentive
should be challenging enough tc pose a question of uncer-
tainty as to its attainment. They felt the incentive must
be clearly established, concisely worded, and objectively
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tested to determine the contractor's success or failure in
meeting the incentive requirement. They felt that the
reward for accomplishing the incentive should reflect the
risk involved in attaining it. The ability to motivate is
the hardest characteristic tc build into an incentive
because it requires that the Government understand what
motivates the contractor they are dealing with at the time.
The same factors that motivate one contractor do not neces-
sarily motivate another.
E. CONTRACTOR MOTIVATION
Before meaningful incentives can be formulated for a new
weapon system, there must be a clear understanding of what
it is that motivates a defense contractor to do business
with the Government. To understand how to motivate a
defense contractor:
You must recognize that you are dealing with people
formed together to make up an organization. The goals
and intentions of the individuals are expressed in the
goals and intentions of the organization. [Ref. 19: p.
9]
Every management student is aware of Haslow's "hierarchy of
needs" theory that describes human development in terms of
satisfaction of increasing levels of needs from the need to
meet the bare physiological requirements of life to
achieving the self-actualizaticn he desires as his simpler
needs are satisfied [Ref. 21: p. 32]. However, most do not
realize that a corporation also has a hierarchy that it
seeks to satisfy as it matures and grows during its life
[Bef. 21: p. 34]. Some of these needs or stages a corpora-
tion encounters during its life are: survival, profit,
market share, and prestige. Understanding the stage of
development a contractor is in is the key to understanding
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the best way to motivate it. Put simply, a contractor just
entering the business is seeking to satisfy survival needs.
That means he is interested is getting all the business he
can get. After satisfying the basics of survival the
contractor will direct his efforts more toward increasing
his profit. As the contractor grows profit will still oe a
concern but he will direct his efforts toward more company
growth. As his growth needs are satisfied the contractor
will seek to increase his market share of the industry. As
all these needs are satisfied the contractor will seek to
satisfy the need for prestige for the company. They will
atte.mpt to become known throughout the defense industry as
the best producer of aircraft or ships and when a tough
problem arises they will attempt to become known as the ones
to call. [Ref. 21: pp. 38-40]
The perspectives of Government and industry are
different as to what motivates a contractor.
The Government perceives short-term monetary objectives
such as profit, cash flow- and return on investment as
the key motivators. The contractors express more
interest in the long-term strategic objectives such as
company survival ana growth and the reputation objec-
tives of producing a guality jroduct and ensuring proper
performance. Both parties agree, however, that profit
is one of the key factors, and that incentive fees which
can result in higher prorits are an effective means of
motivating the custcmer. [Ref- 22: p. 51]
Government and contract representatives perceived monetary
rewards such as incentive fees to be the most effective
types of incentives. Second in perceived effectiveness
among both groups were the risk reducing types of incentives
such as capital investment protection and long-term funded
contracts- [Ref- 22: p. 51] Some disincentives were also
identified in the literature and were verified by the
contractors interviewed- These included excessive regula-
tion, socio-economic requirements, unallowable costs, and
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Cost Accounting Standards; however, the top three disincen-
tives were: excess Government interference, excess paper-
work, and program instability resulting from poor Government
planning. [Ref. 22: pp. 51-52]
In order to motivate a contractor motivation must occur
on two levels. First, it is necessary to motivate the
corporation and second to motivate the people that make up
the corporation. To motivate the contractor, planning must
start before the contract award. The Government must
assemble information on the objectives of the acquisition,
the internal and external constraints on the Government's
behavior during the acquisition, the contractor's objec-
tives, and any constraints on his behavior [fief. 7: p. 59].
The Government must understand that industry places more
interest in long-term profit objectives (a good product and
continuing business relationships) than it does on short-
term profit [Ref. 7: p. 75]. To motivate a contractor on
the second level, the employees, it is necessary to under-
stand what motivates people to do what they do. Frederick
Herzberg pointed out that the motivation to perform a task
must be developed from within the individual and that the
best that managers can do to motivate their employees is to
create an environment that ignites those desires within them
[Ref. 23]. It must be recognized that what motivates people
varies with people and with situations [Ref. 24: p. 645].
Six factors which do create the situations needed to
motivate employees are:
(1) _ The challenge found in the work. If this is to be
minimized, people must know the purpose and scope of
"their job responsibilities, what their authority is, and
what is expected of them, and they must have a belief in
the value of what they are doing. (2) Status. Itincludes titles, promotions, and such symbols as office
size and appointments. (3) Leadership* that is, the
urge to be a leader among ones peers or in ones field or
industry- (4) Competition. The realization that others
are competing for the job, instant contract, or market
position of the company. (5) Fear, this takes many
forms, including fear of error, failure, loss of a job,
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or a reduction of a bonus or salary. j[6) Money is a
very effective motivator; most often it is more than
mere money, it is the prestige that accompanies it when
an award is received. [Ref. z5 ]
In order to motivate a contractor the Government must
understand where it stands in the evolution of the business
and what the contractors needs are. Further, the contractor
must be motivated from two levels, the corporate level-
through an understanding of the corporate objectives, and at
the people level through an understanding of the factors
that motivate people to do their best effort.
Contractors interviewed stated that a number of factors
motivated their ccmpanies to do business with the
Government. First, they felt the business was relatively
stable. The contractors indicated that even though the
intensity of the business and the volume of defense work
shifted from time to time there was sufficient work to make
it a viable industry. Second, they felt there was a defi-
nite need for their product and that the need would continue
to exist. Third, they stated a patriotic reason for their
participation in defense work and felt they were making
significant contributions to the defense of this country.
Finally, they stated that defense contracts were generally
very profitable. They said some contracts were more profit-
able than others but overall the return on investment in
defense contracts was very respectable. It is important to
realize that defense contractors are businesses and to exist
they must satisfy the basic function of a business: to
create a customer [Ref. 26: p. 61]- The customer is created
by contractors directing their attention to two basic activ-
ities, marketing and innovation [Ref- 26: p. 61]- Defense
contractors do business with the Government because the
customer exists, it's profitable, the market can grow, and
it provides an arena for innovative technology that can be
applied in the commercial activities of the industry.
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P. INCENTIVES: WHAT AND WHEN?
The inteviewees were all asked what would motivate them
to spend more design effort tc improve maintainability in
new systems and they provided two basic answers. First,
they said that if the Government were willing to invest more
money in the development of mere maintainable systems the
contractor would design as much maintainability into the
system as desired. Their secend response was that their
greatest fear was failure to perform to the level reguired
by the contract. They said that if a maintainability param-
eter was stated in the contract that was achievable,
demanding, and realistic that they would treat it as a spec-
ification and put the design effort in to accomplish it, but
would adjust the price of the contract accordingly. They
much preferred, however, that more positive approaches to
improving maintainability be used and recommended that posi-
tive incentives be used rather than the fear of failure as
the key motivator. "Big fears— If misused to drive disci-
plinary devices can cause only resentment and resistance,
they can only demotivate." [Ref. 26: p. 237] In the case of
defense contractors they felt that appeal to the profit
motive would be a very effective incentive. "The. first test
of any business is not the maximization of profit but the
achievement of sufficient profit to cover the risks of
economic activity and thus to avoid loss." [Ref. 26: p. 60]
The contractor 1 s desire to avoid economic risk and loss of
profit can also be used to motivate the contractor. Those
interviewed felt that program stability and multi-year
procurements were two viable means of motivating the
contractor without having to resort to the use of exagger-
ated levels of profit. Program stability would help to
permit the contractor to improve his efficiency by encour-
aging the contractor to invest in equipment and facilities
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that he might not necessarily do if the program's survival
was in doubt from year to year. Multi-year procurement can
also motivate the contractor and reduce the economic risk
and possibility of loss of profit he faces in every new
system. In multi-year procurements the contractor may take
advantage of economic opportunities in purchasing materials
and in establishing production runs that promote efficiency,
reducing the risk to the contractor and the cost to the
Government. Contractors also favored the use of incentives
to motivate maintainability improvements because they put
some of the decisions on which objectives to pursue during
design in the hands of the designers.
When asked when to use incentives, all those interviewed
were in agreement that incentives should be utilized
throughout the development and production of the new system.
They felt that the plan to use incentives as well as the
targets of the incentives should be communicated to industry
as soon as possible. They felt that if the objectives of
the program were to develop a system that was highly reli-
able, maintainable, or supportatle and incentives were to be
used for that 'end, then the industry needed to be aware of
it at the beginning of concept exploration. Those inter-
viewed stated that it was not necessary to specify the
specific parameters of the incentives at this point bat only
that incentives were going to be used and what general areas
were going to be targeted. As the acquisition process
progressed and concept exploration concluded, the specific
incentive targets could be developed according to the objec-
tives established. In this manner, they felt that the
incentives could be tailored to stress those areas that
would motivate the contractor the most. For example, at
program initiation the DoD component requesting the system
specifies that maintainability is to be an objective of the
system and funds have been allocated for that purpose.
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During concept exploration the program manager ensures that
industry is aware of the incentives available, what role if
any maintainability will play in the selection process, and
what areas are being targeted in maintainability. As alter-
native concepts are evaluated and the ones to continue into
Demonstration and Validation selected, the parameters for
maintainability and the potential incentives available can
be defined. As Demonstration and Validation continues, the
designers can make the necessary trade-offs to design main-
tainability into the system. When the system enters Full
Scale Development, the maintainability of the system can be
tested on the hardware developed. As Full Scale Development
concludes, the maintainablity of the system can be verified
on the prototypes and pilot production models produced.
Finally, as the system enters production and use in the
fleet, the maintainability of the system can be tracked for
the first year or two of its life to determine if the param-
eters established and tested are valid.
G. SOMMAEY
This chapter discussed the concepts and issues
surrounding the use of incentives to motivate defense
contractors in their design efforts. The chapter included
discussions on the structure of incentives, those factors
that motivate the contractor and contractor personnel, the
significant characteristics of incentives, and why contrac-
tors do business with the Government. The chapter concluded
vith a discussion of the timing of incentives and what
incentive means were favored most by contractors.
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V. THE IHHO¥&TITE EXAMPLE OF THE F/A^IS
A. GENEEAL
This chapter presents an example of how incentives were
utilized to improve maintainability on a major weapon system
acquired by the Navy. The weapon system presented is the
E/A-18 Fighter/Attack aircraft. The system is unique
because it represents a genuine attempt to place reliability
and maintainability on an eguai level with the cost,
performance, and schedule requirements of the system. The
approach to maintainability as well as an analysis of the
reasons for its success are contained in the following.
The F/A-18 program was the first major acquisition
program in the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIF.) to be
managed under the disciplines of the "New Look", the purpose
of which was to ensure that reliability and maintainability
was by design, not by chance [Eef. 27: p. 2]. The F/A-18
program used incentives to motivate McDohnail Aircraft
Company (HCAIR) to improve upon the minimum requirements
specified in the contract in four areas: reliability, main-
tainability, life cycle cost, and F/A-18 program milestones
[Eef- 27]. The incentive program for improve! reliability
and maintainability reflects the new emphasis on the
supportability of new weapon systems entering the inventory
and provides an excellent example of how incentives can be
used to motivate the contractor to improve the maintain-
ability of a system under design.
The incentive program for the F/A-18 for maintainability
focused on three parameters: Mean Flight Hours Between
Maintenance Actions (MFHBMA) , System Direct Maintenance
Manhours per Flight Hour (DMMH/FH) , and organizational level
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Maintenance Manhours per. Flight Hour (MMH/FH) . The total
potential award to be won was $12 million and was to be
equally divided among the three parameters so that the
maximum potential award in any parameter was $4.0 million.
The proposed plan called for payment of the awards upon the
demonstration at key decision points of meaningful achieve-
ment of measurable maintainability. [Ref. 28] The objective
of the awards program was to motivate the contractor to
exceed the specified maintainability requirements in the
contract by attaching monetary awards to maintainability
levels achieved in excess of the minimum parameters speci-
fied. Payment of the awards was contingent upon demon-
strated performance in an operational environment at
predetermined times. These demonstrations were conducted at
the 1200 and 2500 cumulative flight hours test points on
full scale development aircraft and the 9003 cumulative
flight hours test point for pilot production aircraft using
data gathered during the previous six month period. Each
maintainability parameter was evaluated at two different
cumulative flight hour demonstration periods. [Ref. 28]
Organizational level MMH/FH was the first parameter
evaluated. It was evaluated in two increments with a total
potential award of $4.0 million. The first demonstration
was conducted at the 1200 cumulative flight hour mark and
had a potential award of $1.5 nillion which the contractor
could win if the contractor achieved 8.0 MHH/FH or less on
the aircraft. The contractor would earn 50% of that award
if he achieved 10.0 MMH/FH and nothing if he reached the
minimum target of 11.0 MMH/FH. The contractor achieved a
7.72 MMH/FH and won the full award. The second increment
for this parameter was conducted at the 2500 cumulative
flight hour mark and had a potential award of $2.5 million.
The targets for this increment were tougher than those of
the previous increment. If the contractor achieved only 8.0
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MMH/FH at this increment he wcuid not receive any of the
award, reaching 6.0 MMH/FH would win 50% of the award, and
attaining 5.0 MMH/FH would win the entire award. MCAIH
reached 3.62 MMH/FH and won the total award for this incre-
ment. MCAIR* s total award for this parameter was 34.0
million and they reduced the MMH/FH from the minimum target
goal by almost 400%. [Ref. 28]
The second parameter evaluated was DMMH/FH and was also
evaluated in two inciements with the potential award split
into $1.5 million at the 2500 cumulative flight hour mark
and $2.5 million at the 9000 cumulative flight hour mark.
In the first increment the minimum target goal was 20.5
DMMH/FH and earned no award, 5 C% of the award was earned if
the 17.5 DMMH/FH was achieved, and 100% of the award was
earned if the demonstrated DMMH/FH was 16.0 or better.
MCAIR attained a 6.32 DMMH/FH and earned the full $1.5
million. The second increment was demonstrated on four
pilot production aircraft at the 9000 cumulativa flight hour
mark. The targets were more restrictive than the first
increment with the minimum acceptable value to earn any
award being 14.4 DMMH/FH and 12.0 DMMH/FH earning 100% of
the potential award. MCAIR achieved a value of 6.48 DMMH/FH
and won the full $2.5 million for this increment. For the
parameter DMMH/FH, MCAIR exceeded the target goal by almost
300% and earned $4.0 million in incentives. [Ref. 28]
The final parameter evaluated was MFHBMA and it too was
evaluated in two increments. The first at 2500 flight hours
with an award of $1.5 million and the second at 9000 flight
hours with a potential award of $2.5 million. The minimum
acceptable value for this parameter in the first increment
was 0.5 MFHBMA and earned no award, reaching 0.3 MFHEMA
earned 50% of the award, and reaching 1.5 MFHBMA earned the
total award. MCAIE reached a value of 1.14 MFHBMA and
earned $1.14 million for the first increment. The second
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increment contained mere restrictive goals and was evaluated
at the 9000 flight hour mark. The minimum target was .75
MFH3MA and earned no award with the maximum award being
given for reaching a goal of 1.6 MFHBMA. MCAIE reacned the
value of 1.31 MFHBMA and received $2.12 million in awards.
MCAIE exceeded the targets by almost 200% and earned a total
of $3.26 million for this parameter and $11.26 million of
the $12 million offered for maintainability improvement.
[Eef. 28]
The demonstrations were performed by operational
personnel at operational sites. The evaluation plan called
for a board of MCAIE and Navy personnel to accumulate the
data, evaluate the maintenance performed, determine if
adjustments were warranted to any measured maintenance
activties as defined by criteria agreed upon by both
parties, and finally they determined if award of the incen-
tive should be given and what percentage of the total award
would be given for values between targets. Table 1 contains
a summary of the target goals, potential awards, attained
goals, and earned awards by MCAIR in the F/A-18 program
[Eef. 28].
Some of the lessons learned from the experience in the
F/A-18 program are contained in the following and are
described by acquisition phase. In Concept Exploration the
following strong points were identified: (1) High level
management (Navy and MCAIE) attention and support of main-
tainability objectives was essectial to getting the results
obtained. This attention was the result of briefings to the
contractor by high level Navy personnel which included the
Assistant Commander for Systems and Eeiiability, the Deputy
Chief of Naval Material for Reliability, Maintainability,
and Quality Assurance and the Program Manager for the
system. "This high level attention was a major factor in
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attention and emphasis with cost and performance to achieve
the desired levels of E&H. " [Eef. 27] (2) The award fee
provisions helped to ensure contractor emphasis on RSil
disciplines. The establishment of the firm award fee
dollars provided a clear understanding of what was expected
in the area of maintainability.
This provision for award fee for achieved maintain-
ability is considered a prime factor in the motivation
and dedication shown by the contractor to correct main-
tainability problems as they were identified during the
development phase. [Ref. 27]
(3) Also during this phase visits by key contractor manage-
ment personnel and design supervisors to operational sites
provided a good insight into fleet concerns and the problems
that exist on current aircraft weapon systems. This
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provided an understanding of the need for changes in
existing design concepts to eliminate or reduce the impact
to the fleet of the new system and to reduce the cost of
ownership to the user and increase the operational readiness
of the new system. [Eef. 27]
During Full Scale Development the following positive
actions occurred: (1) Periodic appraisals of contractor
performance in the area of maintainability were an effective
means of continuously reinforcing the contractors motivation
toward maintainability issues. The appraisals were
conducted on a quarterly basis and awards were made for
performance in life cycle ccst milestones and program
management milestones. [Eef. 27] (2) Extensive use of
Design Reviews and Technical Coordination Meetings assured
adequate consideration was given to maintainability require-
ments during design and testing. During these meetings the
maintainability implications of every decision was discussed
and stressed the use of trade studies to balance cost,
weight, and performance with maintainability parameters.
These meetings were attended ly RSM design engineers and
fleet maintenance personnel to provide an effective means of
identifying appropriate maintainability trade-offs.
[Ref. 27] (3) A memorandum of agreement between the Navy
and MCAIR was negotiated before Full Scale Development
flight testing which established a Reliability and
Maintainability Review Board. The board consisted of Navy
and MCAIR personnel which assessed, verified, and corrected
all R8M data as necessary before submission into the Navy
and MCAIR data systems. The memorandum described the ground
rules for documenting failures, maintenance actions, and
manhours during the flight test program and helped alleviate
any potential arguments. The Beard also provided RSM design
engineers with excellent feedback on any problems that
developed. [Ref. 31] (4) They integrated the reliability
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and maintainability activities of the contractor to ensure
that the maintainability design baseline and the logistic
support analysis used the allocations developed by the
contractor rather than independently derived values. In
this manner, significant differences in the basic values
used to determine spares provisioning and manning levels
were avoided. For the F/A-18, the contractor used the engi-
neering activity allocations as the source of data for the
logistics planning community. [ Ref . 27] (6) Contractor
corporate management personnel attended Preproduction
Reliability Design reviews. Attendance kept them informed
on the impact of R&M and on concerns of the Navy. It was
also useful in convincing management to ensure adequate
funds and manpower were allocated to the program and were
not deleted when other performance problems began to appear.
[Ref. 27]
Normally during the production phase of a program engi-
neering effort starts to disappear. However, this was not
the case in the F/A-18 program. For the first time on a
major system, the contractor's R&H engineers were allowed to
follow and track the aircraft into the fleet. [Ref. 27]
This monitoring allowed verification of the effectiveness of
the numerous RSH corrective actions identified during Full
Scale Development which, due to lead time requirements had
not been incorporated and evaluated in the aircraft during
the Full Scale Development phase. It also provided on-site
evaluation and engineering investigation of any new reli-
ability or maintainability problems not seen during the Full
Scale Development flight testing. This allowed for the
rapid resolution of RSM problems that almost always appear
after the formal testing is complete. [Ref. 27] The F/A-18
program incorporated many of the positive criteria for
incentives discussed in the previous chapter.
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B. ANALYSIS OF THE PROGRAM
An analysis of the F/A-18 program with respect to its
use of incentives for maintain a hi lity requires consideration
of the following: (1) conceptually, should the incentives
motivate the contractor, keeping in mind the significant
characteristics of incentives and the factors that motivate
a contractor as described in Chapter IV, (2) were the goals
realistic enough to challenge the contractor or were they
merely specifications that were established at too lew a
level, (3) were the targeted parameters proper or were they
too general, and (4) were the award payments for successful
achievement or did they amount to funds unnecessarily spent.
Conceptually, the incentives for maintainability in the
F/A-18 program were effective for several reasons. First,
the Navy made a commitment at the outset of the program that
maintainability was going to re a major objective of the
program and required that minimum maintainability specifica-
tions be written into the contract. Second, MCAIR personnel
were provided the opportunity to talk to the customers to
ensure that MCAIR design engineers understood the opera-
tional environment and the conditions under which mainte-
nance would occur. This fostered an attitude of teamwork
between the Government and the contractor. Third, the Navy
allocated $12 million for incentive awards for maintain-
ability which helped to convince MCAIR top management that a
real commitment to maintainability had been made. Fourth,
the awards were designed to be paid as the results of the
maintainability demonstrations were established providing
timely reward for contractor efforts. Fifth, the incentives
were structured as award fees *hich were clearly identifi-
able to contractor personnel. Sixth, corporate management
used the award program in the contract as a means of moti-
vating their employees. MCAIR developed award programs of
53
their own which provided monetary awards for beneficial
suggestions submitted by employees. It also included gifts
to employees consisting of models of the aircraft, coasters,
and other memorabilia all desigred to help maintain employee
enthusiasm for the project. finally, the incentives were
targeted to specific parameters such as MMH/FH, DMMH/FH, and
MFHBMA and the minimum acceptable levels for these parame-
ters, the conditions of testing, definitions of test objec-
tives, and other parameters were mutually agreed upon and
included in the negotiated contract. The incentives were
effective because the contractor was motivated. This moti-
vation stemmed from the following: he was treated as a team
member, he was involved early in the program decision
process, his design engineers as well as corporate manage-
ment were involved in working toward the awards, the awards
were a substantial amount of money, the contractor directed
design efforts toward attaining the maintainability goals,
and the contractor possessed the technical capability to
meet the maintainability objectives stipulated. [Eef. 31]
The second area of concern focuses upon whether or not
the incentives did motivate the contractor's performance.
This issue involves the values for the parameters estab-
lished in the awards payment plan. One Government represen-
tative indicated that the values for the parameters were too
low and that if presented the opportunity to reconstruct the
incentive program he would make those parameters much more
stringent. His opinion was supported by a contractor repre-
sentative with experience on the project who indicated that
the parameters established were well within the company»s
capability so they treated the parameters as they would any
other contract specification. Even though the contractor
directed significant attention to the targeted areas, he
indicated there was never any doubt that the company would
earn a significant portion of the available incentive award.
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The long range effectiveness of the money spent on these
incentives is yet to be determined. However, as the data in
Table 2 show for CY 1983 after an accumulation of 23,831
flight hours by the F/A-18, these areas targeted for incen-
tives reflect a distinct improvement in performance over
other aircraft in the fleet. The MFHBF for the F/A-18 was
more than twice that cf its nearest competitor, the F-4J/S.
The organizational level MMH/FH was less than half the value
of the A-6E and substantially below that of the A-7E. The
real effectiveness of the awards program will not be real-
ized until later when improved aircraft availability and
operational readiness of the I/A- 18 can be demonstrated.
£Ref. 32] The conclusion that can be reached is that even
though the objectives may have been too low to challenge the
design capabilities, the potential award was sufficient to
keep the contractor interested in maintainability and helped
to provide an aircraft with reliability and maintainability
superior to anything in the current Navy inventory.
TABLE 2
R&M Parameters of Fleet Aircraft (CY 19 83)
Aircraft FH MFHBF MMH/FH MMH/FH*
~A=SE 7 17S 10 0~75~T~ ~23T70* "778"
—
A-7E 107,200 0.66 17.38 6.1
F-4J/S 46,904 0.72 24.32 7.8
F-14A 94,258 0.61 24.89 7.5
F/A-18 23,881 1.69 10.47 3.6
*- scheduled maintenance
Source: [Ref. 32]
The F/A-18 program targeted three parameters for incen-
tives: MMH/FH, DMMH/FH, and HFHBMA. These parameters are
very broad categories and as such required extensive defini-
tions of what constituted a maintenance action, a failure,
what time was considered productive and nonproductive for
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purposes of maintenance labor c (imputations as well as others
too numerous to mention here. Appendix C contains the defi-
nitions for accountable and nonaccountabie labor as consid-
ered in the computation of the maintainability parameters.
£Ref. 29] These definitions were necessary because of the
broad scope of the criteria selected for measurement and
incentive targeting and were needed to ensure that the
values of the parameters were properly computed. The broad
scope of the parameters chosen and the numerous assumptions
and definitions reguired as a result made the award process
more subjective than was necessary.
The F/A-18 program contained minimum specifications for
other parameters as well. Among these was a reguired fault
isolation time which specified that 95% of the faults must
be isolated within a time period of five minutes; the
remaining 5% of the faults must be identified within ten
minutes. However, no incentives were attached to this
parameter. This was a valid candidate for an incentive
because it would have an effect on all the general parame-
ters stated in the incentive plan and would have influenced
the designers to focus more attention on the design of the
Built-In-Test-Eguipment (BITE) . The BITE capabilities were
also outlined in the contract and did not have any incen-
tives assigned to it. As a result of the lack of incen-
tives, these items did not receive the same level of
attention as that received by the other parameters.
Consequently, BITE was one of the weakest areas of the whole
system [Eef. 30]- The rationale for targeting the general
parameters was the belief that they would drive the design
of the specific values for fault isolation, fault location,
and other related measures [Ref. 30]. The result, however,
was that by designing to lower the values of the broad
areas, the influence of a particular element that composed
that value could be minimized.
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From the interviews for this study, it was determined
that a better approach would be based on a different
sequence of parameters. The first parameter would be delay
time and the incentive would be targeted specifically toward
shortening the length of time required to detect the fault.
The second parameter to be targeted would be fault location
and the incentives would be targeted specifically toward
shortening the time it takes to localize the fault, gain
access to the failed component, and isolate the failed part.
The third parameter would be the time necessary to adjust
and recalibrate the system after maintenance is completed.
As was stated in the chapter on maintainability, these three
elements are directly hardware related and by specifying
challenging targets in these parameters and attaching
significant incentive awards to them, the design engineers
would be motivated to design the hardware with these consid-
erations in mind. To significantly shorten these times, the
designers would be faced with solving the engineering
problem with either the addition of more BITE, simpler hard-
ware, or a combination of the two. If successful in short-
ening these times, the maintenance cycle and the cumulative
values of maintainability such as MTTR and MMH/FH would be
reduced. These parameters would be identified during
Concept Exploration and definitized during Demonstration and
Validation. The demonstrations and testing for award
purposes would occur during the Full Scale Development phase
of the acquisition.
The parameters described above would stimulate the
designers to design maintainability into the system. To
ensure that the engineering efforts continue, two other
parameters could be targeted for incentives: (1) establish
incentive awards for MTTR objectives and (2) establish an
award schedule for operational availability. The purpose of
these incentives would be to maintain contractor interest in
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maintainability during the Full Scale Development and early
Production and Deployment phases of the acquisition.
Although these elements are not strictly hardware related,
significant incentives in this area may motivate the
contractor to develop more efficient and informative tech-
nical publications and maintenance procedures for the
system.
It is important that whatever parameters are selected,
they be objectively attainable and demonstrable during the
testing and award process. The parameters should be
constructed so that the contractor does not ignore one
aspect of the system to achieve an award in another area.
During the F/A- 18 program one of the weakest areas of the
system was its BITE. The contractor pursued the fi&M incen-
tives at the expense of BITE which did not have any incen-
tives targeted to it. As a result, the F/A- 19 was inundated
during the testing of the system with false alarms which
caused confidence problems among Navy and MCAIR maintenance
personnel [Ref. 32]- The sole use of the cumulative main-
tainability parameters was partially responsible for this
because some of the maintenance actions and their associated
times caused by BITE failures could be assumed out of the
calculation of the targeted parameters. Targeting the
incentives to specific values such as delay time, fault
location time, or failure isolation time would help elimi-
nate much of the subjectivity involved.
C. SOBHARY
In this chapter an example of a successful application
of incentives for improved maintainability was presented.
The awards payment plan and the incentive parameters used in
the F/A- 18 program were identified and an analysis of the
reasons for the success of the program as well as possible
areas for improvement were identified.
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VI. ANALYSIS OP THE PROBLEMS AND ISSJES IN INCENTIVES FOE
HATTAINABILITY
A. GENERAL
This study has discussed the components of maintain-
ability, its role in the acquisition process, its impact on
the life cycle costs of a weapon system, and its role in the
design of a weapon system. In addition, the issues and
concepts involved in the use of incentives to motivate
contractor performance were alsc discussed. Further, the
study provided an example of a major weapon system acquired
by the Navy in which incentives were used to motivate the
contractor to direct his attention to the maintainability
characteristics of the system as well as other program
objectives of the Government. The case demonstrated a
successful application of incentives to improve the main-
tainability of a new system. However, the fundamental ques-
tion still remains as to whether it is appropriate to use
incentives for the purpose of improving maintainability. If
it is assumed that it is appropriate, then a number of ques-
tions as to how it would be accomplished immediately arise.
This chapter will address questions concerning the appropri-
ateness of incentives for maintainability improvement, the
structure of the incentive plan, and other maintainability
issues that should be considered.
B. APPBOPBIATENESS OF INCENTIVES
The question of appropriateness of using incentives for
maintainability improvement was initially answered by those
interviewed from a parochial view. They were viewing the
issue from their own company product or Government position.
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From that limited perspective, those interviewed were split
as to the appropriateness of using incentives to improve
maintainability. One Government official related that
incentives were not necessary tc motivate the contractor to
design maintainability into a new system; that if the
Government could determine the level of maintainability it
desired in the system then that level should be specified in
the contract and the contractor's failure to achieve that
level would be tantamount to nonperformance. He stated that
it was not desirable to use incentives because of the asso-
ciated administrative burdens that accompany them and a much
simpler method of accomplishing the same objective was
available. He also stated that he was not convinced that
the money needed for the incentive awards would really buy
any more maintainability. Similarly, an engineer for a
missile producing contractor concluded that it clearly was
not appropriate to use incentives for maintainability
improvement in missiles. The emphasis, he said, was on
reliability since the nature of the weapon mandates
successful performance on demand. His rationale was if the
missile worked, it was destroyed. If it did not, the prob-
ability was also high that it would be destroyed either
through enemy action or through the user's action to protect
himself during landing or disarmament operations. However,
these views were in direct contrast to those expressed by
other contractors; especially those involved in the design
of integrated systems. One program manager enthusiastically
supported the use of incentives for maintainability improve-
ment in systems on which he worked. He stated that the
technology existed to improve the maintainability of the
system he supervised but the Government was satisfied with
the existing maintainability level and was not willing to
fund any improvement. As a result, he said, there was no
motivation for him to put more design effort into the
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product. Another contractor interviewed stated that incen-
tives were more appropriate for weapon systems with new
technology than it was for the mature technology in older
systems. He stated that it would be more appropriate to use
incentives in the Midgetman program because of the flexi-
bility available in the design cf that program that was not
now available in the older Minuteman system.
When asked to respond to the issue on a more generic
level, the contractors interviewed responded more favorably
toward the idea whereas the Government representatives were
more reluctant to endorse such a plan, presumably because of
the extra burdens it placed on the administration of the
contract. Government representatives interviewed felt that
incentives were inappropriate because their effectiveness
could not be predetermined, they added complexity to the
contract, the contracts were more costly to administer in
terms of manpower, money, and time, and in general possessed
the necessary framework for many more disputes related to
the incentive provisions. The contractors generally felt
they were appropriate because their use shifted the
decision-making process for design trade-offs to the
contractor who they felt was more capable of making the
trade-off decisions. They said incentives helped to commu-
nicate the objectives of the Government in a particular
program, it provided the contractor the opportunity to earn
more profit as a result of his innovation or efficiency, and
it allowed the contractor the opportunity to more effec-
tively manage the risk involved in the system's development.
This study found that the appropriateness of using
incentives for maintainability is dependent upon several
factors. First, is the mission of the system being
acquired. It would be inappropriate to use incentives on a
system that is designed to be used once and is either
destroyed or discarded afterward, as in most missile
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systems. It is also inappropriate to use incentives in a
system in which the maintenance concept stipulates that only
intermediate or depot level maintenance will be performed.
The biggest gains in terras of equipment readiness will be
made by efficient maintenance at the organizational level.
Consequently, the maintainability of a system should be
dictated by organizational level maintenance needs.
The second factor that determines the appropriateness of
incentive use is the state of technology of the system. If
the technology of the system is mature, there may not be any
innovative way to design a system to be more maintainable
and the potential increases in maintainability will be
offset by the design effort to attain it. On a. system that
is pushing the state-of-the-art, potential gains in main-
tainability are enormous. The existence of trade-offs in
design and materials, the availability of alternate technol-
ogies to solve the engineering problem, and the willingness
of those involved in the design to be innovative are all
factors that assist engineers in improving maintainability.
Another factor which helps to determine the appropriate-
ness of incentives is the maturity of the design. This
factor is closely related to technology in that in a mature
design, most improvements that could be made have been made
through configuration changes or product improvement and the
potential gains again would not offset the effort to attain
them. The Minuteman system is a good example. It is a
mature weapon system that has been in use for a long time.
Clearly, it would not be appropriate at this stage in the
system's life to try to motivate the producers of the
missile to design more maintainability into the system even
though periodic changes in the components of the system do
occur. On the other hand, the STEALTH program with a design
and technology still in its infancy possesses enormous
potential gains in maintainability and with a little motiva-
tion, the contractors involved may well pursue them.
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Finally, one must consider the objectives of the
program. If lowering the support costs of the system is an
objective, then maintainability incentives may be appro-
priate. If keeping the acquisition costs of the program to
a minimum is the objective, then incentives may not be
appropriate because they tend tc require more funding at the
start of the life cycle of the system than may be tolerable.
Contractually, incentives will require more administrative
effort and supervision than contracts without them and if
simplicity is an objective, then incentives may not be
appropriate. However, if the objectives are to stimulate
contractor performance, lower the life cycle costs of the
system, and produce the most maintainable system affordable,
then incentives may very well be appropriate.
Several factors have been mentioned regarding the appro-
priateness of using incentives for maintainability and from
the responses of those interviewed and the literature, it
could be concluded that the decision to use incentives must
be made on a system-by-system basis. The decision is not
one that can be put off until late in a program. It must be
made at the outset considering those factors mentioned above
as well as any additional relevant issues peculiar to the
program or situation involved- If the decision is made that
incentives are not going to be used, then an alternate means
of satisfying the program's maintainability objectives must
be found. However, if the program manager or decision
authority decides it is appropriate to use incentives for
maintainability improvement, then a number of problems arise
that must be addressed before any contracts are awarded.
These problems will be addressed in the next section.
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C. STRUCTURE OF THE INCENTIVE PLAN
The structure of the incentive plan is another area that
must be addressed. Specifically, it concerns the timing and
method in which payment will he made after successful demon-
stration of the parameter. Earlier in the study the share
ratio structure for incentive contracts was discussed.
Interviewees stated it would be extremely difficult to use
this structure for maintainability incentives. The reason
for the difficulty is the inability to establish the magni-
tude of the award until a significant period of time in the
operating life of the system has passed. The share ratio
would have to be applied to the estimated savings in life
cycle costs that would result by achieving a level of main-
tainability better than that originally specified in the
contract. It would also be difficult to eguate a dollar
value to a specific maintainability parameter's value. It
would be hard for a contractor to be very enthusiastic about
such an arrangement because it would be difficult for the
contractor to determine the value of the incentive.
Additionally, the contractor would not be paid the incentive
for a considerable period of time after the design effort
was completed and the amount cf savings that would result
would be dependent upon factors other than those the
contractor could control, such as personnel training or
supply support. The contractor would also have to establish
a means of collecting the data from the field. Finally, the
complexity of such an arrangement would make it almost
useless as a tool for corporate management to motivate their
employees. There is, however, an acceptable alternative.
Under the award fee incentive structure, a specific
amount of money is established as an award and specific
objectives for the contractor are formulated. The contrac-
tor's performance is reviewed periodically and a
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determination of whether or not the award has been earned is
made. If the objective has been met, the award is paid.
For maintainability incentives the award fee would be more
efficient because it can be more objective, it can be peri-
odically reviewed, it is paid in a more timely manner, the
potential award is clearly established, contractor manage-
ment and employees could readily establish the relationship
between the effort required to accomplish the incentive and
the expected payoff that resulted, and it would be a much
simpler instrument to draft and administer in the long run.
The F/A-18 program used the award fee structure for its
reliability and maintainability incentive program very
successfully.
D. OTHER MAINTAINABI1ITY INCENTIVE ISSUES
In Chapter IV, the significant characteristics of an
incentive were described. These characteristics were: (1)
a positive approach (ie., reward accomplishment rather than
penalize nonperformance)
, (2) recognition of achievement,
(3) the challenge of the incentive, (4) timeliness of award
of the incentive, and (5) the incentive must motivate the
contractor. In addition to those characteristics of an
incentive, the chapter also described four issues to
consider when constructing incentives to motivate a
contractor. These are: (1) attempt to construct an incen-
tive that can be used by management to motivate the
employees of the company as well as its management, (2)
attempt to ascertain the contractor's needs by determining
the stage of maturation of the company, (3) realize the
appeal to the profit motive is a good motivator throughout
the maturation process and is the easiest to use, and (4)
understand that other risk- red ucing incentives are avail-
able. Two examples of additional incentives that might be
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used are multi-year procurement and capital investment
incentives. These must generally be done before the work is
initiated and the incentive demonstrated and will be hard to
sell to the decision authority because of regulatory
requirements and the fact that successful accomplishment of
the incentive cannot be guaranteed.
However, once the decision has been made to motivate tne
contractor to improve maintainability through the use of
incentives, several issues arise that must be addressed.
The first of these is a determination of what measures or
elements of maintainability will be targeted for incentives.
To be effective, the target must be defineable, measurable,
demonstrable, and testable. Contractors interviewed
expressed concern about the Government's ability to
adequately determine these measures. Too often, they said,
they received vague and incomplete specifications or work
statements that made it very clear the Government did not
know exactly what it wanted. Incentive targets must be
explicit. For maintainability, the components chosen as
targets must be hardware related and under the design
control of the contractor. In addition, the target must be
constructed as objectively as possible. If a formula is
used to compute the value of the element, then all assump-
tions regarding the derivation cf the formula, the defini-
tions of terms used in the formula, and any circumstances
that would result in adjustments to the value of those terms
must be stipulated as part of the contractual instrument.
The interviews revealed that part of the problem of what
to target is the source of the information concerning the
targets. Government program personnel can offer suggestions
based upon their view of the problem as can perspective
contractors, but these sources will naturally bias their
information in favor of their own parochial interests or
abilities. The best sources of information on the
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maintainability requirements for a new system are the oper-
ating and maintenance personnel who will operate and main-
tain it. In the F/A-18 program, contractor personnel
visited fleet units and talked to operating and maintenance
personnel during concept exploration. This permitted them
to become familiar with the operating and maintenance envi-
ronment of the system before getting too heavily into the
design of the aircraft. As a result the designers possessed
a better understanding of the nature of the problem faced by
the using units. The operating and maintenance personnel's
viewpoint will also be biased. However, it will be biased
in the direction of the realities of the environment in
which the system must be used and not by design or engi-
neering theory or the political issues that surround the
program.
The target of the incentive should be a specific param-
eter and not some general measure of maintainability. For
example, MTTR, MTBM, or MMH/OH are too general to be used by
themselves and, as discussed earlier in the study, in the
case of MTTR, many of the elements that comprise it are not
controllable by hardware designers. If general measures are
targeted then they should be used during the later portion
of the program. For instance, to motivate the contractor
during full scale development and production and deployment
of the system, measures like MTTR and Ao may be more appro-
priate. Using incentives in these areas will help to stimu-
late the contractor's interest in shortening LDI , MDT, and
ADT by ensuring that adequate supply support, training
procedures, technical publications, and facilities are
considered by program personnel. To motivate the contractor
early in the program, the design related components of main-
tainability such as delay time, fault location time and its
components, and adjustment and calibration time should be
targeted. These components are very objective, measurable,
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and subject to design trade-offs. In considering what to
target for maintainability incertives, targets that motivate
the contractor over the duration of the acguisition process
are more appropriate. During design and development of the
system targets should be considered that are hardware
specific and as objective as possible. During the later
phases more general measures such as Ao and H TTR to help
stimulate the contractor's interest in the other elements of
maintainability should be used.
Several interviewees indicated that after deciding what
parameters will be targeted for incentives, several issues
remain unanswered. These concern primarily the demonstra-
tion and testing of the parameters chosen for incentive
award. They include the method of testing of the hardware
produced, the personnel conducting the test, the evaluation
criteria for determining the success or failure of the
contractor's effort, and who will make the determination
that the contractor has earned the incentive. Answering
these guestions affords the Government the opportunity to
motivate the contractors by involving them in the construc-
tion of the evaluation process. One method of accomplishing
that task is to form a board of program and contractor
personnel to collect and analyze the data from the testing
of the system and prepare recommendations to be submitted to
program management for determination of the success of the
contractor's effort. Testing for incentive award purposes
should be done by operating and maintenance personnel who
will receive the system. The test should be conducted under
the supervision of an independent testing facility. The
testing personnel would also submit findings to the program
manager regarding the success cf the contractor's efforts.
Testing should be done on full scale development and produc-
tion models of the system. To win the incentive the
contractor must demonstrate achievement of the targeted
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parameters on full scale development and production models
of the system. It was pointed cut by some interviewees that
by involving the contractor in the evaluation process, many
of his concerns about the fairness of the evaluation
criteria or testing methodology will be alleviated.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter analyzed the issues surrounding the appro-
priateness of using incentives for maintainability improve-
ment. It also provided an analysis of the problems and
issues involved in the construction of incentives for that
purpose. The- next chapter provides the conclusions, recom-
mendations, and answers to the research questions formed in
the study.
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VII. CONCIUSIOHS AND fiECOMMENDilIQ»S
A. CONCIDSIONS
Eased upon the findings by the researcher the conclu-
sions for the study are contained in the following:
1 . Incentives are appr ojor iate for use in Gover nmen t
contracts as a method of motivating contractors to
improve main tainability in wea£on systems under
design. Maintainability is composed of elements of
sufficient objectivity tc be appropriate targets for
incentives. Chapter III/ Section B described the
components and identified the particular elements
best suited for incentives. Chapter IV, Sections C
and D discussed the issues involved in the structure
of incentives as well as tha significant characteris-
tics which should be considered when attempting to
use them to motivate a contractor to improve main-
tainability. Chapter V contains an example of the
successful application of maintainability incentives
in the F/A-18 program and discusses the factors that
led to its success. Maintainability is described by
many different measures and an effective incentive
might be applied to any one of them. The F/A-18
program demonstrates that incentives targeted to
maintainability can have a significant impact on the
priority and level of attention given to it during
design and development of the system. The incentives
also help the Government to establish their maintain-
ability objectives for the system and communicate
these objectives to the contractor. The ultimate
result of the incentives in the F/A-18 program was a
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superbly maintainable aircraft that will provide
better availability, lower operating and maintenance
costs, and improved equipment readiness to the fleet.
There is every reason tc believe that this success
can be duplicated in new weapon systems being
acquired if incentives for maintainability are used.
The process of attempting to motivate the c ontr acto r
to improve maintainability by_ means of incentives is
not widely used to day. The contractors interviewed
indicated that maintainability specifications were
present in most of the contracts they had, but incen-
tives were not attached to them. They indicated the
emphasis was still on the reliability of the system.
As discussed in Chapter IV, Section D the reliance on
merely a specified level of maintainability will not
motivate the contractor to do more than comply with
the specification. If contracting officers wish to
induce the contractor to improve significantly above
that level, maintainability must be given more
priority and attention by Government acquisition
managers. The F/A- 1 8 represents the first system in
NAVAIR to use an incentive program that included
maintainability incentives as part of the contract
and its success helped to demonstrate that maintain-
ability was an appropriate target for incentives.
Based upon the success enjoyed by the F/A-18 program
and with continued interest in improved maintain-
ability by program management, as prompted by users,
incentives used for maintainability improvement will
become more prevalent.
Maintainabilit y is playing a greater role in the
acquisition of e quip ment . The reliability and main-
tainability program for the F/A-18 program is an
excellent example of the increasing role
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maintainability as well as the other elements of ILS
are playing in acquisitions today. Chapter II,
Section A and Chapter VI, Section A described the
increasing role of maintainability in the acquisition
of weapon systems today. The theme of the "New Look"
program at NAVAIH is that reliability and maintain-
ability should be by design, not by chance.
4. Maintainability has a definite impact on the life
cyc le cost of the system and must be considered from
program initi ati on. Maintainability is not a feature
that can be added to a system just prior to produc-
tion. Maintainability is a design feature subject to
trade-offs against other design features such as
reliability, cost, weight, and performance.
Decisions to increase the maintainability of a system
are made at the expense of other traits and must be




Mai ntainabilit y objecti v es must be established earl y
in the program and those objectives must be clearl y
communicated to industry^, laboratories, or univ ersi -
ties prepari ng the alternative concepts for the
s yst em. As discussed in Chapter III, Section C and
Chapter IV, Section F, maintainability objectives
must be established early in the acquisition process
and considered throughout. If incentives are to be
used to achieve these objectives, the areas to be
incentivized and how much money will be committed to
the effort must be ccmmunicated to the concept
designers early in their efforts.
6 « The role of maintainability will remain secondary to
the reliability of a weapon sy_stem. This will remain
the case unless specific attention is directed to
maintainability because of the pressure on the
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contractor to have a fail-proof weapon system.
Chapter III, Section D discussed the trade-offs
involved in the design of a weapon system and pointed
out that a direct trade-off exists between reli-
ability and maintainability. It was established
during interviews that contractors had more to lose
designing a system that was unreliable than one that
was just unmaintainable and would continue to direct
their efforts toward system reliability at the
expense of maintainability unless the Government
directed otherwise.
Different contractors are motivated b_x diff eren t
incentives. A corporation is a growing and maturing
organization and some incentives that motivate it
during its early years will not necessarily motivate
it as the organization matures. To be effective,
incentives must be tailored to fit the contractor's
needs as well as the Government's objectives. In
Chapter IV, Sections A and E, the significant charac-
teristics of incentives and the factors that motivate
contractors were discussed. The role of these char-
acteristics was shown in Chapter V, Section C with
the F/A-18 example and again in Chapter 71, Sections
B and C in the description of factors to be consid-
ered in using incentives for maintainability.
Only three of the eig_ht components of maintain abilit y
are suitable for incentives. Those components are
delay time, fault location time, and adjustment and
calibration time. The remaining five components are
predominantly functions of the other elements of
Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) and the reduction
of the times in those components will be reflected by
the ILS planning for the system. As discussed in
Chapter III, Section B and Chapter IV, Section C,
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these components are hardware related and are the
most suitable for incentives because they ultimately
drive the values for the cumulative measures such as
Mean Time To Repair (MTTE)
,
Maintenance
Manhours/Operating Hour (MMH/OH) , and Operational
Availability (Ao) . Further, using incentives
targeted at those parameters will force the designer
to consider Built in Test Equipment (3ITE) and other
design factors when designing the system.
9 • The award fee contracting method of struct urin g
incentives has the greatest potential for achi evin g
maintainability goals. This was demonstrated in
Chapter V, Section Cin the F/A-18 example and again
in Chapter VI, Section C in the discussion of the
issues involved in structuring the incentive. To
effectively motivate in this context the award fee
structure requires a concise definition of the target
of the incentive, the amount of the award to be
earned, and the demcnstration requirements for
earning the award. The use of the award fee allows
the contractor to make key decisions regarding the
incentive by providing management with a valuation of
the award.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Based upon the findings of the study and the conclusions
derived from it, the researcher recommends the following:
1 . The use of incentives to motivate contractors to
design more maintainabi lity into new weapon sy stem s
should be expanded beyond the current le vels .
Incentives have been shown to be an effective method
of directing contractor attention to Government
objectives in system acquisitions and, if
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sufficiently rewarding, will induce the contractor to
devote more effort toward accomplishing those objec-
tives. Maintainability has been shown to be a
significant driver in the operating and maintenance
costs of a weapon system. It has demonstrated
repeatedly its effect en the availability of the
system and fleet readiness. Therefore, to help
reduce the operating and maintenance costs and
improve the availability and readiness of the equip-
ment to be used in the fleet tomorrow, it is impera-
tive that maintainability be a prime objective in the
acquisition of systecs under design today.
Incentives are an effective means of ensuring that
maintainability will receive the attention it
warrants. Expanding the use of incentives for main-
tainability improvement could be encouraged if
program managers were reguired to stipulate maintain-
ability objectives and demonstrate maintainability
growth in the systems they manage. This will require
a commitment on the part of the Government and
contractor personnel early in a program and will
require continued attention to the Reliability and
Maintainability implications of every decision in the
program.
An experiment on the maintainability characteristic s
2i certain weapon sy_stems should be conducted to
determine which family, of weapon systems are most
appropriate for maintainability incentives. Before
meaningful incentives can be constructed for improved
maintainability it is necessary to understand the
peculiar maintainability characteristics for indi-
vidual weapons families and whether maintainability
is an appropriate incentive target. The experiment
would involve the identification of the type of
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weapon (eg., tank, missile, ship, aircraft, etc.),
maintenance concept generally employed for the
system, the operational mission of the system, and
the degree of organizaticnal maintenance required for
the system. The experiment would help establish
classes of weapons in which maintainability incen-
tives are highly appropriate, appropriate, or not
appropriate as a means cf accomplishing program and
operational objectives. It would also help to iden-
tify parameters most suitable for incentives.
Establishing these classes would also assist in the
development of a general model for structuring main-
tainability incentives. The buying commands should
be tasked with performing such an experiment on all
weapon systems under their purview and publishing the
results in a guide appropriate for use by program
managers.
3. A generalized model for structuring, maintainability
incentives should be developed for families of weapon
systems and applied in their acquisition on a case -
by-case basis. A generalized model would help to
segregate the differing maintainability objectives
that often exist between different weapon types and
will help to identify the role of the maintenance
concept in the formation of those objectives. For
example, the maintainability objectives, characteris-
tics, and maintenance concept for a tank are
different than those of an attack aircraft and both
will differ from those in a radar system. To struc-
ture the most effective maintainability incentives
possible, these differences must be clearly identi-
fied and addressed. The buying commands could accom-
plish this by identifying maintainability objectives
for all their system acquisitions in general terras
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and then developing for each weapon family (eg. tank,
aircraft, ship, etc.) those specific maintainability
objectives they desired that system to possess.
After identifying the fanily's maintainability objec-
tives, they could be utilized to develop specific
parameters to be available for use as a guide in
developing incentive targets. As programs are initi-
ated, the program managers would have a general guide
to assist them in tailoring maintainability incen-
tives to meet specified program, family, and customer
maintainability objectives.
Incentives should be tailored to fit the needs of the
contractor i nvol ved. Tailoring of incentives to
contractor needs is iaportant to ensure that an
incentive designed to motivate a contractor in a
particular part of a program, actually motivates him
in that area. For instance, a contractor with a
production contract that desperately needs the
activity in the plant tc remain open during a busi-
ness slump between contracts is not. going to be moti-
vated by an incentive that encourages him to deliver
earlier than the date specified in the agreement. Or
consider an incentive that adds 3% more profit to the
contract to reward design efforts in reducing the
weight of a system, but costs the contractor 5% to
pay for the effort. A contractor needing more profit
at this particular time will not be motivated to
pursue the incentive. However, a contractor that is
attempting to build his reputation with DoD or his
industry peers as an innovator or problem solver may
take less profit on the instant contract to satisfy
his need for prestige. The importance of under-
standing the contractor's business needs is to help
make the incentives chosen more effective in
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accomplishing Government objectives. Tailoring of
incentives to contractor needs can be accomplished by
reguiring more analysis cf the contractor's position
in the industry prior to the construction of the
incentive to ensure it has potential to motivate the
contractor. It will also reguire flexibility on the
part of Government contracting representatives to
take the time to develop a suitable incentive
arrangement.
5- In incentive contracts for maintainability the use of
award fees should be encouraged instead of the
sharing formulas. The award fee reguire s more defi-
nition in terms of target of the incentive and more
money early in a system 1 s life cycle, but is gener-
ally considered to be a more objective arrangement
than the sharing formula. Additionally, the award
fee provides several advantages in an incentive
arrangement for maintainability that the share ratio
cannot meet.
C. ANSHEES TO THE RESEABCH QUESTIONS
The answers to the primary and subsidiary research gues-
tions are provided in the following:
1 . The primary r esearch guest ion was: Can incentives be
used in Gover nment contracts to improve the mai ntain -
ability of e quipment acquired in the future? The
answer to the primary research guestion is clearly,
yes. Incentives have been shown to be an effective
method of directing contractor attention toward the
maintainability characteristics of the equipment
under design. The incentives used might take a
variety of forms. They may be positive incentives
focusing on such things as profit, multi-year
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procurements, or capital investments. Negative
incentives might also be used. These would concen-
trate on the contractor's fear of failing tc perform
as required by the contract. Some of the possible
negative approaches might include maintainability
warranties or extremely tight maintainability
specifications.
2. What is maintainab ility? Maintainability is a char-
acteristic of design and installation in a weapon
system that makes it possible to meet operational




How does maintainability relate to the acquisition of
§Suip_ment toda_Y? Maintainability is a characteristic
of design and as such must be considered at the
initiation of the program. Maintainability is also
subject to trade-offs with other design parameters
such as reliability, weight, or performance. It must
be considered when formulating system objectives and
must be considered in sutsequent design decisions.
4. What motivates a contractor to do business with the
Government today? Defense contractors are motivated
to do business with the Government for a variety of
reasons. First, the defense business is relatively
stable in spite of periodic changes in volume and
intensity. Second, defense contractors perceive a
vital need for their product today and in the future.
Third, defense contractors do business with the
Government for patriotic reasons and believe they
make a significant contribution to the defense of
this country. Finally, defense contractors believe
that the business is very profitable and provides a
respectable return on their investment.
79
What are the significant characteristics of con trac t
incentives? Successful contract incentives generally
possess the following characteristics: First, the
incentive is designed as a positive motivator of
contractor performance. It is used to encourage the
contractor to extraordinary performance rather than
penalizing the contractor for substandard perform-
ance. A second characteristic of an incentive is its
recognition potential, that is, its ability to recog-
nize the accomplishments of the contractor and his
employees. Another characteristic of an incentive is
the challenge it presents to the contractor involved.
Challenging and realistic objectives and incentive
targets are essential tc direct contractor interest
and innovation in the targeted areas. A fourth char-
acteristic is the timeliness of the award of the
incentive after demonstrated performance. The award
should be paid when the target is achieved and not
hidden in progress payments or in a contract settle-
ment paid some time in the future. Finally, the
incentive should motivate the contractor to perform.
Understanding the motives of the contractors involved
in the program is also necessary to develop
successful incentives.
What would the objectives of incentives for maintain -
ability be in Department of Defense contracts? The
objectives of maintainability incentives in DoD
contracts are: to reduce the life cycle costs of a
new system, particularly with respect to the oper-
ating and maintenance ccsts of the system; (2) to
improve the operational availability of newly
acquired systems; (3) to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of the support efforts for the new
system; (4) to improve the operational readiness of
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the units in the fleet that receive the new systems;
(5) to promote a team approach in the development of
new systems; and (6) to encourage the contractor to
achieve a higher level of performance than the
minimum specifications for the system.
7- What are the current me thod s used to promote main -
tainabil ity in Government contracts? Maintainability
has not been a favorite target for incentives in
Government contracts until recently. Most of the
incentives in the areas cf support have been directed
toward the reliability of the system. The method-
ology in those efforts have varied from the use of
award fees given to the contractor for meeting speci-
fied reliability goals to the use of warranties to
guarantee the reliability of a system with the
contractor being responsible for the costs of the
unreliable systems. The F/A-18 program represents
the first weapon system acguired by NAVAIR to target
maintainability goals for incentive award in addition
to. the more traditional ones established under award
fee type contracts.
8. How can incen tives be used to motivate the contr acto r
to improve maintainability? Incentives can be used
to motivate the contractor to improve maintainability
in new systems by focusing corporate management
attention to the targets of the incentives, identi-
fying Government's maintainability objectives in the
system, and to reward the contractor for design effi-
ciency and innovation.
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Additional research should te conducted in the following
areas: (1) to determine if multi-year contracts would be an
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appropriate means arid effective method of improving the
maintainability of new weapons, and (2) to determine if
capital investment incentives would be an effective or
appropriate means of motivating the contractor to improve
the maintainability of a system under design.
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED
1. Althaus, Walter F. Program Manager Ground/Surface
Systems- ESL Core. San Jose, California, Interview,
August, 198 4
2. Annett, Robert 1. ILS Manager-MX, Hestinghouse




Belcher. Kenneth A. Senior Engineer, Aerojet Strategi
Corporation. Citrus Heights, California, Interview,
4. Dellinger, Don, Mechanical Engineer, RSM Branch, U.S.
Naval Air Systems Command, Washington D.C. Interview,
August, 1984
5. Froleich, Gordon, Vice President for Contracts,
California Microwave, San Jose, California, Interview,
September, 1984
6. Glaser, John, Logistics Manager, Wright Patterson Air
Force Base, Dayton, Ohio, Interview, September, 1984
7. Hobbs, J.C. Director, Contracts and Pricing. Teledyne
Ryan Electronics, San Diego, California, Interview,
August, 1984
8- Kearney, James F. Senior Systems Engineer, Grumman
Aerospace Corporation, Mineola, N.ew York, Interview,
October, 1984
Kelly, Tom, Contracts Manager, Hughes Ground Systems
Division, Pomona, California, Interview, August, 1984
McTeague, Mark, Major DSMC, Integrated Logistics
Support Coordinator, LMA Branch, Headguarters U.S.
Marine Corps, Washington, D.C. Interview, October,
1984
11. Melnick, Eugene K. Maintainability Engineer, Boeing
Aerospace Co. Bellevue, Washington, Interview,
October, 1984
12. Peterson, Elmer L. B-1B ILS Manager, Rockwell
International, Carson, California, Interview, October,
1984
13. Pliska, T.L. Assistant Manager, RSM Division, Hughes
Ground Systems Division, Pomona, California,
Interview, August, 1984
14. Quail, Stanton E. Logistics Manager, Ford Aerospace
Communications, Sunnyvale, California, Interview,
October, 19 84
15. Sarri, Al, Manager RSM Division, Hughes Ground Systems
Division, Pomona, California, Interview, August, 1984
APPENDIX B
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
1. How do you view the logistic support issues when
preparing or responding to a RFP or EFQ?
2. What role does maintainability play in a system you are
designing and how are trade-off decisions made during the
design?
3. What would motivate you to focus more design effort into
the improvement of maintainability in systems under design
today?
4. What do you consider to be the significant characteris-
tics of an incentive in a n incentive contract or similar
arrangement?
5. Are incentives currently being used in any of your
present defense contracts and. what areas are being targeted
for the incentive? If not, why?
6. Is the Government using incentives to encourage the
improvement of maintainability in the design of future
systems?
7. What is it that acts as the greatest incentive for your
company in participating in defense contracts?
8. Where and what should the incentive be when attempting to
improve the maintainability or other logistic support
considerations in the new systens being acquired today?
9. How would you construct an incentive to improve the main-
tainability in a new acquisition today?
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10. Do you think that improved maintainability can be accom-
plished through the use of incectives and if not, is there a
more appropriate method to be used?
APPENDIX C
F/A-18 NON-ACCOONTABLE LABOR DEFINITIOHS
The following are definitions of non-accountable labor
foe the F/A-18 program: [Ref. 29]
1. The labor to rework anj part drawn from supply to
reestablish its useful life or pre-issue check.
2. Labor of removing, installing, checkout and testing
involving the acguisitior of parts through cannitali-
zation. This applies only to the time spent on the
cannibalized aircraft.
3. Maintenance induced damaged where technical data is
not being followed.
4. The modification, rework, or adaptation of nonstan-
dard parts to create a usable spare.
5. Maintenance performed as a result of operator error,
or improper handling of eguipment.
6. Look phase of inspections not defined in Maintenance
Reguirements Cards.
7. Maintenance actions for failures induced by equipment
operation outside design envelope.
8. Maintenance actions for failures induced during main-
tenance when such actions could have been avoided if
proper GSE were on hand.
The following are considered nonproductive types of
effort and were excluded when determining required
parameters:
1. Delivery of parts to close proximity of the aircraft.
2. Parts turn- in time.
3. Personal time (coffee breaks, etc.) .
4. Researching manuals for the purpose of training
personnel.
5. Delay of all types including weather.
6. Time spent proceeding to and from the scene of work.
7. Any interruption resulting from flight test type
equipment, and special investigations which impede
the normal maintenance process.
8. Forms documentation other than entrv of direct,
accountable maintenance actions/time upon the
VIDS/MAF, or applicable CLEAR forms.
9. Non-active maintenance times to include cure times,
battery charging times, and wait time after erasing
Ultraviolet (UV) PROMS before reprogramming.
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10. Repair time spent as a result of human error in not
following approved technical manuals/maintenance
procedures as determined on a case-by-case basis by
the MDRB.
11. Validation or revision of technical data and similar
tasks not related to required maintenance.
12. Movement of aircraft due to weather, disaster preven-




2. U.S. Department of Defense Directive 4100.35,
Development of Integrated Logistics Support for
5"YsTems~ancI Equipment, June 196"T.
3. Mosher, John P. C.P.L. , Integrated logistic Support
Handbook Volume 1 , RcckTIIIe. MdT: Ad"vancecl
JppTicafions Consultants, Inc., 1983.
4. Schemmer, Benjamin F. "Pentagon, White House and
Congress Concerned over Tactical Aircraft Complexity
and Readiness", Armed Forces Journal International^
May 1980.
5. U.S. Department of Defense Acquisition Circular 76-39,
Memorandum for Improving the Acguisition Process,
IprII~307-198"T7
6. U.S. Department of Defense Memorandum, Subject:
Guidance on the Acquisition Improvement Program, June
7. U.S. Procurement Research Office, Contr acto r
Motivation Theory, and Applications, by Williams,
Robert-?". ' and Care, D~avi3 M. , MarcE, 1931, (Defense
Logistics Studies Information Exchange, Microfiche No.
LD 46768A) .
8. U.S. Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, Ma jo r
System Acquisitions, March 29, 19 82.
9. U.S. Naval Material Command- Navy Program Mana ger 1 s
Guide, Washington, D.C., 1984.
10. Blanchard. Benjamin S. Logistics Engineering and
Manageme nt, Englewood Cliffs, TT.J. : Pcenfice-HalT,
T9"8T.
11. U.S. Department of the Navy NAVORD OB 39223,




13. Morris, William, ed., American Heritage Dictionary of
the English langji ag_e , Boston: HougKton Mifflin
Company, T979.
14. Cummins, Micheal J. , Incentive Contracting for
National Defense: A Problem of Opti mal Rlsk~Sh~a ring ,
Stanford": "Stanford University, 19/5.




16. Fisher, Irving N., Controlling Defense Procur emen t
Costs: An Evaluation or Incentive Coniractinq
Experience, Santa Barbara: R"and Corporation,
KovemEer, 1968.
17. Atthearn, James E. , Risk and Insurance, Los Angeles:
West Publishing Co., T9"7"9"
.
18. Levy, Haim and Sarnat , Marshall, Capital Inves tmen t
and Financial Decisi ons , Englewood" Cliffs, N.J. :
Ffentrce-HaTI7 19H21
19. MacCary, Robert F. , Contract Incentives and Contracto r
Motivation, Ft. Lee. 17a.: Florida Institute of
TecfnoTogy, Nov. 1981, (Defense Logistics Studies
Information Exchange, Microfiche No. 51516A).
20. Organ, Dennis W. and Hammer, W. Clay, Organizational
Behavior : An Applied Psychological ApproacE, Piano,
Tx.: Business "FublicatioEs Inc., T982:
Oppedahl, P.E., Understanding Contractor Motivation
and Contract Incentives, Ft . Bel voir, Va . : Defense
Systems Management College, May, 1977, (Defense
Logistics Studies Information Excnange, Microfiche No.
LD 40367A)
.
22. Jaggard, Micheal F. and Cartwright, Howard Jr., An
Assessment of F actors Which Motivate Contractors, M.S.
TEesis, Monterey, ' California, "naval- Postgraduate
School, December, 1982.
23. Herzberg, Frederick, "Cne More Time: How Do You
Motivate Employees," Harvard Business Review, 1968,
(San Mateo Educational "Resources Center, Microfiche,
No. MD 000013) .
89
24. Koontz, Harold. O'Donnell, Cyril, and Weicich, Heinz,
Management. New York: McGrall-HIll Book Company.
T9""3*U7
25. Patton, Arch, Man, Money, and




26. Drucker, Peter F..
Practices, New York
Mana gement Tasks Responsibilities
Harper Z Row Publications, T974".
27. U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Air Systems Command
Report (AIR-51653), F,/A-1_8 Reliabili ty^Maint a inability






28. U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Air Systems




29. McDonnell Aircraft Company Report (MDC A4038-3)
,
F/A- 18 Program Maintainability Performance Evalu atio n
Plan, Washington, ~D~.C". : "CnSated.
30. Cook, Gary Newton and Russell, Robert Wayne, An
Analysis of the Management of Reliability an d"
Maintainability in tKe'"T7]F'T5 E£°9.£ affl # fiTSZ Thesis,
ITavaT Postgraduate School, Honterey, "California, 1978.
31. U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Air Systems
Command, F/A-18 Reliability and Maintainability
Evaluation Prog ram Memorandum of Agree ment ,
Washington, D . C . : January 79*79".
32. U.S. Department of the Navy, Board of Inspection and
Survey Model F/A- 18 A Airplane Final Trials Phas e
Service Acceptance Trial s""7£roj.ec t BTH 2J_3T"3, Tatuxent




1. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
2. Navy Office of Acquisition Research 1
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 22060-5426
3. Chairman 1












6. Major Laurence Farnen Jr. 2
77/3 La Verdura Dr.
Dallas, Texas 75248
7- Defense Technical Informaticn Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
8. Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange 2
U.S. Army Logistics Management Center






F228 F22^ 1+ Farnen
c 2.
c «l Using incentives to
improve maintainabili-
ty.
?9 SfP B9 3 5 4 2 6
' .' 4- \^
Thesis
F228U
c.l
Farnen
Using incentives to
improve maintainabili-
ty.

